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Case Notes
Alien's Deportation-Boutilier v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 363
F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1966).
CLIVE MICHAEL BOUTILIER, a native and citizen of Canada, was admitted into the
United States for permanent residence on June 22, 1955 at the age of 21. Eight years
later in the process of filing for citizenship, Boutilier admitted to the Immigration
and Naturalization Service that he had had homosexual experiences, both before
and after entry into this country. The Board of Immigration Appeals directed his
deportation on the grounds that upon entry into this country, he was a homosexual
and therefore excludable as a "psychopathic personality" within the meaning of sec-
tion 212 (a) (4) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952 (Act).' On ap-
peal the court held2 that an alien's sworn statement admitting homosexual activities
prior to his entry into the United States was sufficient evidence of his "psychopathic
personality" to warrant his deportation under section 241 (a) of the Act.8
The power of Congress to exclude aliens is absolute.4 Congress may exclude aliens
altogether or may define the terms and conditions upon which they may come into
or remain in this country.5 Whatever procedure Congress authorizes to exclude an
alien is due process as far as that alien is concerned.6 Proceedings to deport,7 how-
ever are not exempt from constitutional requirements.8 In Bridges v. Wixon,9 Mr.
166 Stat. 182 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §1182(a) (4) (1964).
This section provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the following classes of aliens shall be
ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded from admission into the United States
* 0 0 0 0 *
(4) Aliens afflicted with a psychopathic personality, epilepsy, or a mental defect; ...
'Boutilier v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 363 F.2d 488 (2d Cir.), cert. granted,
385 U.S. 927 (1966).
8166 Stat. 204 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §1251 (a) (1964).
Any alien in the United States (including an alien crewman) shall, upon the order of
the Attorney General, be deported who (1) at the time of entry was within one or
more of the classes of aliens excludable by the law existing at the time of such entry.
'Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
5AM. JUR. (SEcoND) Aliens and Citizens §49 (1962).
0 Shaughnessy v. Mezi, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
766 Stat. 208 (1952), 8 U.S.C. 1252 (b) (1964).
8 Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49 (1950); see generally Note, Constitutional
Restraints on Expulsion and Exclusion of Aliens, 37 Minn. L. Rev. 440 (1953).
'326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945).
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Justice Murphy said, in a concurring opinion, that "once an alien lawfully enters
and resides in this country, he becomes vested with rights guaranteed by the Con-
stitution to all people within our borders." More specifically, it has been held that a
resident alien is a proper party to question the constitutionality of a statute affecting
him.10
In the instant case Boutilier contended that the statutory language "psychopathic
personality" is void for vagueness. The question of vagueness most frequently arises
in construing penal statutes. There the underlying principle is that no man should
be held criminally responsible for conduct that he could not reasonably expect to be
proscribed.1" However, the Supreme Court has applied this principle in civil pro-
ceedings12 and in Jordan v. DeGeorge,B the court examined for vagueness a statute
involved in deportation proceedings. There, where an alien was convicted of de-
frauding the government of liquor tax revenue, the court held that the statutory
language "crime involving moral turpitude"'14 afforded an alien sufficient notice that
conviction of such a crime would result in deportation.
In Fleuti v. Rosenberg,15 the first case to consider, the vagueness, section 212 (a)
(4) of the Act, the Ninth Circuit reversed an order of deportation on the ground
that the statutory language "psychopathic personality" failed for vagueness as ap-
plied to deport a homosexual when the deportation order was based in part on evi-
dence of post-entry behavior. The court reasoned that the statute failed to give peti-
tioner notice that the continued practice of homosexual activity after entry might
subject him to prosecution and deportation as evidencing a prohibited condition
before entry. "While the post-entry conduct was not itself the ground of deportation,
but was used as evidence of a pre-entry deportable condition, the prejudice would
nevertheless be substantial."'16 In a similar case 17 the Ninth Circuit in a Per Curiam
opinion relied on Fleuti as controlling. It is interesting to note that the Immigration
Act of 1965, amended section 212 (a) (4)18 to specify sexual deviates as excludable.
As this amendment was enacted after Boutilier's entry it is not applicable to him.
The legislative history19 of this amendment indicates that it is largely in response to
the decision in Fleuti.20 In the instant case, the immigration service became aware
0United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1924).
' United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1953).
'2Small Co. v. Am. Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233 (1925).
13 Jordan v. DeGeorge, 351 U.S. 223 (1951).
"Immigration Act of 1917 § 19 (a), 39 Stat. 889.
15 302 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1962), remanded on other grounds, 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
16 Id. at 656.
17 Lavoie v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 360 F.2d 27 (9th Cir. 1966).
'879 Stat. 919 (1965), 8 U.S.C. 1182 (1966).
19H.R. REP. No. 745, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1965), to accompany H.R. 2580.
0' Id. at 16.
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on April 17, 1962,
set aside a deportation order and enjoined its enforcement holding that Section 212 (a)
(4) was unconstitutionally vague in that homosexuality was not sufficiently encom-
passed within the term "psychopathic personality." Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 652.
To resolve any doubt the committee has specifically included the term "sexual devi-
ation" as a ground of exclusion in this bill.
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of Boutilier's condition when he admitted in an affidavit submitted to a naturaliza-
tion examiner as part of his application for citizenship, that he had been arrested
in October 1959 on a charge of sodomy. In response to a request for additional in-
formation, Boutilier revealed that his first homosexual experience occurred in Can-
ada when he was 14 years old, and that from the age of sixteen until he entered the
country at twenty-one, he voluntarily engaged in homosexual activity three or four
times a year. While Boutilier does not contend that the government failed to comply
with the statutory procedures under which deportability is determined,21 he does as-
sert that section 212 (a) (4) is void for vagueness and that the order directing his
deportation deprived him of due process.
The court viewed the delayed exclusion effect22 of the act as furnishing "a back-
stop or check designed to intercept those whom Congress believed should not have
been admitted into the United States in the first instance." 23 In applying section
212 (a) (4) excluding those aliens afflicted with a "psychopathic personality" the
court conceded that this section is not a "model of clarity." The majority relied on
legislative history quoting from Quiroz v. Neely. 24 "[W]hatever the phrase 'psycho-
pathic personality' may mean to the psychiatrist, to the Congress it was intended to
include homosexuals and sex perverts. It is that intent which controls here."2 5 In
Fleuti the court reasoned that in deciding whether a statute fails for vagueness, the
statute must be judged on its face without reference to legislative history.26
The majority did not find Fleuti authoritative, reasoning that in Fleuti the ex-
amining officer chose to rely heavily on post-entry behavior, while in the instant case
there was no indication that the Special Inquiring Officer failed to understand that
section 212 (a) (4) was directed solely at a pre-entry condition.
In rejecting Fleuti as not applicable, the court ignored the main thrust of the
holding, specifically, that the statutory language "psychopathic personality" does not
give adequate notice to an alien that certain post-entry conduct may be used to evi-
dence a pre-entry condition which would subject him to deportation. In the instant
case, the court emphasized that Boutilier could have been deported under the Act
even if, after his entry, he had commenced leading a life of impeccable morality.
However, one might conclude that if Boutilier had never been arrested for sodomy,
after his entry into the country, immigration officials would never have had reason
to question his sexual activities before entry.
0 See statute note 7 supra.
The delayed exclusion effect of the Act required the alien to be deported in two out
of three possible factual situations. First, an alien may have been a "psychopathic per-
sonality" before entry into the country and not after. Second, an alien may have been a
"psychopathic personality" both before and after entry. Third, an alien may become a
"psychopathic personality" only after entry. The delayed exclusion effect of the Act can be
used to deport aliens in the first and second hypotheticals but not in the third.
Boutilier v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., supra note 2, at 492.
24 Quiroz v. Neely, 291 F.2d 906, 907 (5th Cir. 1961).
Boutilier v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., supra note 2, at 494.
Fleuti v. Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 657.
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Bankruptcy-Drawee Bank's Liability For Payment Of Checks-Without
Notice of Voluntary Petition-Bank of Marin v. England, - U.S. - ,
87 Sup. Ct. 274 (1966).
BETWEEN AUGUST 27, 1963 and September 17, 1963 Marin Seafoods drew five checks
to Eureka Fisheries on its account with the Bank of Matin. On September 26, 1963,
Marin Seafoods filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. On October 2, 1963 Eureka
Fisheries presented the bankrupt's checks at the Bank of Marin, and they were ac-
cepted and paid. The bank had no notice of the bankruptcy of its depositor. The
trustee in bankruptcy sought a turnover order from the referee who held both payee
and bank liable. The District Court granted the order, and its decision was affirmed
on appeal.' The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 2 The question presented was
"whether a bank which honored checks by a depositor drawn before his bankruptcy
but presented for payment after he had filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy,
is liable to the trustee for the amount of the checks paid where the bank had no
knowledge or notice of the proceeding."3 The Court reversed and held that the Bank
of Marin was not liable.
Section 70 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act provides that a "trustee of the estate of a bank-
rupt.., shall ... be vested by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt as of
the date of the filing of the petition." (Emphasis added).4
The Supreme Court does not interpret this section to imply that "the bankrupt's
checking accounts are instantly frozen in the absence of knowledge or notice on the
part of the drawee of the bankruptcy."'5 The Court asserts that, although title to the
bankrupt's property6 passes to the trustee in bankruptcy, "the trustee succeeds only
to such rights as the bankrupt possessed; and the trustee is subject to all claims and
defenses which might have been asserted against the bankrupt but for the filing of
the petition."7
In Allen v. Bank of America,8 it was decided that:
[T]he relation of banker and depositor is founded on contract. The essence of
the bank's obligation under such debtor and creditor contract is that in con-
sideration of the deposit by the customer or depositor, the bank will whenever
by the presentation of a genuine check in the hands of a person entitled to re-
ceive the amount of such check, a demand for payment is made, honor such
check if sufficient funds to cover the amount are on deposit. 9
1352 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1965).
383 U.S. 906 (1966).
'Bank of Marin v. England, 87 Sup. Ct. 274 (1966).
'Bankruptcy Act § 70(a), 52 Stat. 879 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1964).
5 Bank of Main v. England, supra note 3, at 276.
0 Bankruptcy Act § 70 (a) (5), 52 Stat. 879 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110 (a) (5) (1964).
"Bank of Marin v. England, supra note 3, at 276. See Zartman v. First Nat'l Bank, 216
U.S. 134 (1910); Thompson v. Fairbanks, 196 U.S. 516 (1905).
8 Allen v. Bank of America, 58 Cal. App.2d 124, 136 P.2d 345 (1943).
' Allen v. Bank of America, supra note 8, at 127. See also Weaver v. Bank of America, 59
Cal.2d 428, 431, 30 Cal. Rptr. 4, 7, 380 P.2d 644, 647 (1963). When such a contract is
breached, the cases show that an action also sounds in tort. Siminoff v. James H. Goodman
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The Court reasons that, because of this contractual obligation, "[T]he bank has
the right and duty.., to honor... checks ... absent a revocation that gives the bank
notice prior to the time the checks are accepted or paid by the bank."10 The Court
quotes from Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.11 to illustrate that the
proper notice requirement: "[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due
process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calcu-
lated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action .... ,12
The filing of a petition in bankruptcy, however, has been pronounced by the Su-
preme Court in Mueller v. Nugent18 as,
... a caveat to all the world and in effect an attachment and injunction.., and
on adjudication, title to the bankrupt's property became vested in the trustee,
§§70, 21 e with actual or constructive possession, and placed in the custody of
the bankruptcy court.14
This doctrine would clearly seem to imply that after adjudication the contract be-
tween bank and depositor is void; adjudication therefore operates "as a revocation
of the drawee's authority,"15 even though no notice has been given to the bank.' 6
In Bank of Marin, the petition in bankruptcy was voluntary and such a volun-
tary petition is considered adjudicated immediately upon filing, 17 and, therefore, the
caveat doctrine would apply.
In Lake v. New York Life Ins. Co.,18 the court pointed out that there was much
confusion concerning the application the caveat doctrine and that some courts,
Co. Bank, 18 Cal. App. 5, 121 Pac. 939 (1912); Reeves v. First Nat'l Bank, 20 Cal. App. 508,
129 Pac. 800 (1912).
"Bank of Marin v. England, supra note 3, at 276.
"Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1949).
'Id. at 314. See Covey v. Town of Sumers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956); Schroeder v. City of New
York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); City of New York v. New York, N. H. & H. R.R., 344 U.S. 293
(1952). See also Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385
(1913); Priest v. Las Vegas, 232 U.S. 604 (1913); Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398 (1899). "The
right to a hearing is meaningless without notice." Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S.
112, 115 (1956). "[Stop--] order must be received at such time and in such manner as to
afford bank a reasonable opportunity to act .... "UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-403 (1).
BRITTON, BILLS AND NoTs 520, § 181 & n.3 (2d ed. 1961).
184 U.S. 1 (1902).
"Id. at 14. See May v. Henderson, 268 U.S. 111 (1925); Meek v. Centre County Bkg. Co.,
264 U.S. 499 (1924); Lazarus v. Prentice, 234 U.S. 263 (1914); Acme Harvester Co. v.
Beekman Lumber Co., 222 U.S. 300 (1911); Clay v. Waters, 178 Fed. 385, (8th Cir. 1910);
Babbit v. Dutcher, 216 U.S. 102 (1910).
15 Bank of Marin v. England, supra note 1, at 191.
16 "The mutual accounts between a bankrupt and his bank of deposit are dosed by
operation of law at the time the petition in bankruptcy is filed." In re Fuller, 294 Fed. 71
(2d Cir. 1923); Harrison State Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 116 Neb. 456, 218 N.W. 92 (1928);
Guthrie Nat'l Bank v. Gill, 6 Ore. 560, 54 Pac. 434 (1898); BRADY, BANK CHECKS 25 (3rd ed.
1962).
"7Bankruptcy Act §18 (b), 52 Stat. 851 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §41 (b) (1964). "An adjudication
of bankruptcy is a notorious judicial act of which all persons are bound to take notice."
Southern Ry. v. Cole, 49 Ga. App. 635, 176 S.E. 512 (1934). Although there was some "con-
fusion and uncertainty" concerning the application of the caveat doctrine to bona fide
transfers between filing and adjudication, yet "it was undisputed that after bankruptcy, all
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held that payments to the bankrupt after the filing of the petition were invalid,
while in others it was held that the trustee took the property at the date of ad-
judication and that prior transactions between the bankrupt and persons with-
out notice were not affected. 19
Section 70 (d) of the Bankruptcy Act 20 was added in the revision of the statute by
the Chandler Amendments. 21 It was the intention of Congress 22 that the enactment
of this section "invalidate transactions not granted specific protection under the Act
and thus put to an end the confusion theretofore existing in the decisions." 23
Section 70 (d) (5) of the Bankruptcy Act provides that "except as otherwise pro-
vided in this subdivision and in subdivision g of section 21 of this Act [not applicable
here] no transfer by or in behalf of the bankrupt after the date of bankruptcy shall
be valid against the trustee; provided, however, That nothing in this Act shall im-
pair the negotiability of currency or negotiable instruments. ' ' 24 This section25 seems
conclusively to deny protection to the transfer in Bank of Marin, except for the pro-
viso clause which raises the issue whether holding the bank liable in Bank of Marin
would impair negotiability. 26
In Rosenthal v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co.,27 the court held that:
One of the purposes of the negotiability clause ... is to protect banks who in
good faith ... and without actual knowledge of the bankruptcy, honors [sic]
checks drawn on it by the bankrupt and especially is this true when, as here
the checks were drawn before the filing of the petition.28
transfers of the bankrupt's property both by or to innocent parties were nonetheless in-
valid." 4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 70.66, at 1498 (14th ed. 1964).
18218 F.2d 394 (4th Cir. 1955).
1 Id. at 397. The court refers to discussion in Stone v. Superior Fire Ins. Co., 278 Pa. 400,
123 Atl. 333 (1924).
255 Stat. 882 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(d) (1964).
" See McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Act, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 341 (1937).
2 See H.R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1937); Hearings on H.R. 6439 Before
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 211, 212 (1937); 4 COLLIER,
BANKRUPTCY 70.67, 70.68, at 1499-1512 (14th ed. 1964). McLaughlin, Amendment to the
Bankruptcy Act, 40 HARv. L. REv. 583 (1927).2 Lake v. New York Life Ins. Co., supra note 18, at 399. "[P]rotection ceases upon the
adjudication or when a receiver takes possession, and a third party may have no more
actual notice of the adjudication than of the petition .... Protection stops at the adjudica-
tion... because the bankrupt is then no longer entitled to the consideration due a person
against whom an unfounded petition may have been filed." MACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAw OF BANKRUPTCY 346 (1956). Some examples of protection afforded between filing and
adjudication or appointment of trustee whichever first occurs: Cunningham v. Lexington
Trust Co., 259 Mass. 181, 156 N.E. 1 (1927); Stevens v. Bank of Manhatten Trust Co., 11
F. Supp. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1931); Citizens' Union Bank v. Johnson, 286 Fed. 527 (6th Cir. 1923);
In re Zotti, 186 Fed. 84 (2d Cir. 1911), cert. denied, 223 U.S. 718 (1911); Feldman v. Capitol
Piece Dye Works, Inc., 293 F.2d 889 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 948 (1961).
2 Lake v. New York Life Ins. Co., supra note 18, at 399.
552 Stat. 882 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(d) (5) (1964).
"[T]he draftsmen of the 1938 Act wished to avoid any implication that the restrictive
measures introduced could be taken as a modification of the negotiable instruments law."
4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 70.68, at 1502 (14th ed. 1964).
2 139 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. La. 1965). This case and Bank of Marin v. Engliand appear to be
the only cases dealing with this particular issue. Bank of Matin v. England, supra note 1,
at 190-91.
11 Id. at 736.
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However, a law review commented: 29
In all the cases relied on by [Rosenthal]... the payments were made before ad-
judication ... [and] the bank was protected for reasons equally applicable to any
debtor of the bankrupt and not because it was the drawee of negotiable instru-
ments.80
It is also important to note that the presentment and payment of the bankrupt's
checks by the Bank of Marin is not a negotiation.31 For this reason, it would seem
that the proviso clause is not applicable.
The Supreme Court in Bank of Marin insists that it "does not read these statutory
words [section 70 (d) (5)] with the ease of a computor. There is an overriding con-
sideration that equitable principles govern the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction."32
In Pepper v. Litton,38 the Court stated that bankruptcy courts "have been invoked
to the end that fraud will not prevail, that substance will not give way to form, that
technical considerations will not prevent substantial justice from being done."8 4
In Securities Commission v. United States Realty Co.,85 the Court said, "A bank-
ruptcy court is a court of equity and is guided by equitable doctrines and principles,"
but it added immediately, "except in so far as they are inconsistent with the Act."3 6
There's the rubl "Equitable principles are not applicable in bankruptcy where they
are in conflict with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act."' 7
Comment, 70 HARv. L. REV. 548 (1951).
1Id. at 549. Cf. 4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 70.68, at 1502-03 n.3 (14th ed. 1964). It is also
contended that the proviso was not meant for so broad an interpretation as Rosenthal
allows it. "The effect of the proviso might well be limited to the situation where A obtains
for antecedent value a negotiable instrument from B who in turn received it from the
bankrupt for inadequate present consideration. Any broader construction would gravely
hamper the proper allocation of the bankrupt's assets with doubtful benefits to negotiation."
Note, Bankruptcy and Negotiable Instruments, 64 HARV. L. REV. 958 (1951).
1 "The return of the instrument to the maker, acceptor or drawee upon receipt of pay-
ment is not a negotiation of the instrument within the meaning of section 30 [N.I.L.] nor
a transfer within the meaning of section 49 [N.I.L.], but is a surrender in response to the
legal duty to do so which is imposed by section 74 [N.I.L.]." BmRTTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 49,
at 118 (2d ed. 1961). See Shammos v. Boyett, 114 Cal. App. 2d 139, 144, 249 P.2d 880, 883
(1952); Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Marion Nat'l Bank, 116 Ind. App. 453, 64
N.E.2d 583 (1946); Aurora State Bank v. Hayes-Eames Elevator Co., 88 Neb. 187, 129 N.W.
279 (1911); First Nat'l Bank v. United States Nat'l Bank, 100 Ore. 264, 286-89, 197 Pac.
547, 555 (1921); Seligson, Creditors' Rights, 82 N.Y.U.L. REV. 708, 730-31 (1957); 4 COLLIER,
BANKLJrTCY 70.68, at 1502-03 n.3 (14th ed. 1964).
U Bank of Marin v. England, supra note 3, at 277. See Bankruptcy Act § 2 (a), 52 Stat. 842
(1938), 11 U.S.C. § II (a) (1964).
308 U.S. 295 (1939).
1d. at 304-05. "[C]ourts of bankruptcy are essentially courts of equity and their proceed-
ings inherently proceedings in equity." Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934).
See also Larson v. First State Bank, 21 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1927).
310 U.S. 434 (1940).
RId. at 455. See also American United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138 (1940);
In re Keystone Realty Holding Co., 117 F.2d 1003 (3d Cir. 1941); United States v. Killaren,
119 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1941), cert, denied, 314 U.S. 640 (1941); Sylvan Beach v. Kock, 140
F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1944); Smith v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 84 F.2d 608 (8th Cir. 1936); Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Caldwell, 67 F.2d 802 (8th Cir. 1934); In re Columbia Ribbon Co.,
117 F.2d 999 (3d Cir. 1941).
79 AM. JUR. 2d Bankruptcy § 38 (1963).
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To solve the ambiguities inherent in a case like Bank of Marin, the legislature
has provided the trustee with explicit and carefully defined powers, and "the trend,
since the Chandler Act, has been to confine legislation in this field to clarifying ex-
isting provisions and expediting procedure without radical innovation or upsetting
the basic structure." 8 "The needs of bankruptcy administration require that med-
dling with the estate be limited."39 Collier comments:
In order to remove the bankrupt's remaining property from his hands and to
facilitate its proper disposition in the interests of his creditors, it is considered
essential that the liquidation officer-the bankruptcy trustee-be given full title
to such property with all the rights appertaining thereto.40
The whole thrust of the Chandler Amendments discussed above was to set more
accurate guidelines under law,41 and the court, in Lake v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
admonishes: "Whether the line which has been drawn [by the legislature] is the best
possible solution of the problem is not for the courts to say."42
9 Am. JUR. 2d Bankruptcy § 3 (1963).
3'MACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 346 (1956).
,0 4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 70.01, at 926 (14th ed. 1964).
'Bank of Marin v. England, supra note 3, at 281.
"2 Supra note 18, at 399.
Constitutional Law-Criminal Law-Credit Denied for Sentence Served
Pursuant to Reversed Conviction-State v. King, 180 Neb. 631, 144 N.W.
2d 438 (1966).
ON HIS PLEA OF GUILTY David King was sentenced to an eight year term in the Ne-
braska State Penitentiary. His crime was robbery for which he served five years and
three months before his conviction was reversed. At a second trial King was again
convicted of robbery and sentenced to four years at hard labor. On appeal,' King's
contention was that by the terms of the second sentence he is required to serve a
total of more than nine years, that credit must be given him for the time which he
spent in prison on the first conviction. Rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court
of Nebraska, held, where a conviction and sentence are void and on a subsequent
trial a new sentence is imposed, a defendant is not entitled to credit, as a matter of
law, for time served under the original void conviction and sentence, and that any
crediting of time is a matter of discretion for the sentencing court.2
Multi-jurisdictional decisions on the issue of credit for time served have been
based on four major premises. First, statutory law provides for a grant of credit.3
'State v. King, 180 Neb. 631, 144 N.W.2d 438 (1966).
Id. at 634, 144 N.W.2d at 440.
8 See, e.g., State ex rel. Bone v. Barr, 133 Iowa 132, 110 N.W. 280 (1907); Ex parte James,
38 Cal.2d 302, 240 P.2d 596 (1952); Ex parte Levi, 39 Cal.2d 41, 244 P.2d 403 (1952); People
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Second, statutory law forbids credit. 4 Third, the trial court in the exercise of its dis-
cretion may grant credit.5 Fourth, as a matter of law, absent legislative authority,
there is nothing for which credit must be granted; the reversed conviction is void
and the sentence is null and void. 6
Relying on the latter two of the foregoing premises, the Nebraska court said the
trial court may take into consideration the fact that the defendant had been con-
fined under a void sentence. 7 But, the defendant was not, as a matter of law, entitled
to credit on the second sentence for time served under the original "void conviction
and sentence." 8
The result in King is not unlike the results reached in the majority of like-cases; 9
Nebraska has similarly disposed of the credit issue1 0 before. Yet the question may be
asked whether the issue is one of state law or constitutional due process." It has been
held that the due process clause bars the King result.' 2
The court in King issued a warning to would-be petitioners. Quoting Shupe v.
Sigler,18 it said that for many the bright rainbow and hopes engendered by Fay v.
Noia14 and other habeas corpus cases decided by the United States Supreme Court,
may turn out to be an illusory rainbow with only a "pot of fool's gold" for
its seeker.' 5 By that reference the Nebraska court has, itself, raised the question of
whether the right to a fair trial is free or attended with possible penalty.
In Green v. United States16 the Supreme Court, adopting Justice McKenna's dis-
v. Havel, 134 Cal. App.2d 213, 285 P.2d 317 (1955); In re Turrieta, 54 Cal.2d 816, 356 P.2d
681 (1960); State v. Dehler, 257 Minn. 549, 115 N.W.2d 358 (1962); Application of Kenton,
371 P.2d 742 (Okla. Crim. 1962).
'State ex rel. Nelson v. Ellsworth, 148 Mont. 78, 375 P.2d 316 (1962).
See, e.g., People ex rel. Stokes v. Warden, 66 N.Y. 342 (1876); Commonwealth v. Murphy,
174 Mass. 396, 54 N.E. 860 (1899); People v. Farrell, 146 Mich. 264, 109 N.W. 440 (1906);
Hale v. Commonwealth, 137 Va. 774, 119 S.E. 49 (1923); People v. Ancksornby, 231 Mich.
271, 203 N.W. 864 (1925); People v. Gutterson, 244 N.Y. 243, 155 N.E. 113 (1926); State v.
Malusky, 59 N.D. 501, 230 N.W. 735 (1930); State v. Lindsey, 194 Wash. 129, 77 P.2d 596
(1938); People v. Ashworth, 264 App. Div. 201, 35 N.Y.S.2d 66 (1942); People v. Heard, 396
Ill. 215, 71 N.E.2d 321 (1947); Commonwealth ex rel. Townsend v. Burke, 361 Pa. 35, 63
A.2d 77 (1949); Tilghman v. Mayo, 82 So.2d 136 (Fla. 1955); Vellucci v. Cochran, 138 So.2d
510 (Fla. 1962); Woolford v. Warden, 215 Md. 640, 137 A.2d 646 (1958); Application of
Cannon, 203 Or. 629, 281 P.2d 233 (1955).
0 See, e.g., Ogle v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 219, 63 S.W. 1009 (1901); McCormick v.
State, 71 Neb. 505, 99 N.W. 237 (1904); Ex parte Gunter, 193 Ala. 486, 69 So. 442 (1915);
Ex parte Wilson, 202 Cal. 341, 260 P. 542 (1927); De Benque v. United States, 85 F.2d 202
(D.C. Cir. 1936); Smyth v. Midgett, 199 Va. 727, 101 S.E.2d 575 (1958); Hobbs v. State, 231
Md. 533, 191 A.2d 238 (1963); State v. Anderson, 262 N.C. 491, 137 S.E.2d 823 (1964).
'State v. King, supra note 1, at 634, 144 N.W.2d at 440.
8 Ibid.
'Supra notes 5 and 6.11Knothe v. State, 115 Neb. 119, 211 N.W. 619 (1926); Crommett v. State, 115 Neb. 399,
213 N.W. 743 (1927); Ex parte Cole, 103 Neb. 802, 174 N.W. 509 (1919).
U Patton v. North Carolina, 256 F.Supp. 225 (W.D. N.C. 1966).
'
2Ibid.
11230 F.Supp. 601 (D. Neb. 1964).
14372 U.S. 391 (1963).
1State v. King, supra note I, at 635, 144 N.W.2d at 440.
10355 U.S. 184 (1957).
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senting opinion in Trono v. United States,17 said that the state seeks no convictions
except in legal ways and for that reason it freely affords the means to review rulings
and judgments. The exercise of constitutional rights is not clogged with conditions
or forfeit.' 8 Another case 19 answered that the administration of federal justice re-
quired rejection of the theory that a person may be punished because in good faith
he defended himself when charged with a crime even though his effort proved un-
successful.20 In United States v. Boyce2l the defendant appealed a more severe sen-
tence than his original and pleaded that the more severe sentence penalized him in
his exercise of the right to appeal. The court there said that if it had been the intent
of the trial judge to dissuade the exercise of the right of appeal it would be quick
to condemn the practice, but the second trial included disposition of additional
charges. 22
Two days before the decision in King, the United States District Court for the
Western District of North Carolina reviewed a state court sentence which took no
cognizance of the credit issue.23 The circumstances closely paralleled those in King.
In granting credit, the court said: "[D]enial of credit at a second trial for time
served while in the de facto status of state prisoner is so fundamentally unfair as to
constitute a violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the Constitution." 24 The court held that the imposition of a
harsher penalty, whether by denial of credit for time served or by increased sentence,
without there being contained in the record any facts tending to rationally support
the imposition of such a penalty, inhibits the right to petition for a new trial and
unconstitutionally conditions that right.25
There are other grounds on which credit might have been granted in King and
similar cases.2 6 In the instant case, the court stated that both the conviction and sen-
tence were void.2 7 One year and three months, which the appellant had spent in con-
finement, was treated as a complete nullity.
Time served in prison is not to be considered a nullity, the United States Supreme
Court has said, if the sentencing court had jurisdiction.28 Nebraska has followed that
- 199 U.S. 521, 539 (1905).
1s Green v. United States, supra note 16, at 196.
"9 United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960).
11 Id. at 504.
2 352 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1965).
2 Id. at 787.
2 Patton v. North Carolina, supra note 11.
Id. at 236.
2Ibid.
2 See cases cited notes 3-6 supra.
27 State v. King, supra note 2, at 634, 144 N.W.2d 440.
21 Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 650, 655 (1830). Mr. Chief Justice Marshall stated:
The declaration that this judgment against a person to whom the jurisdiction of the
court could not extend is a nullity, is no authority for inquiring into the judgments of
a court of general criminal jurisdiction, and regarding them as nullities, if, in our
opinion, the court has misconstrued the law, and has pronounced an offence to be
punishable criminally, which, as we may think, is not so.
Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 375 (1879) says:
This distinction between an erroneous judgment and one that is illegal or void is well
illustrated by the two cases of Ex Parte Lange (18 Wall 163) and Ex Parte Parks 93 U.S.
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reasoning.29 Its Supreme Court has observed that if the court had jurisdiction of the
person of the accused and of the crime charged in the information, and did not ex-
ceed its lawful authority in passing sentence, its judgment is not void, "whatever
errors may have preceded the rendition thereof."80 It has further stated that: "The
validity of judicial orders and judgments does not depend upon the reason for the
court's action, but upon the possession by it of lawful authority to hear and deter-
mine the matter before it."31
The trial court had jurisdiction of the person of the accused and of the crime. It
did not exceed its lawful authority in passing sentence.3 2 Yet the court gave no rea-
son why King's sentence should be considered void in contravention of the fore-
going. However, courts have held that when the defendant successfully attacks the
conviction, it is rendered null and void;83 the defendant has waived further consider-
ation of the first sentence.3 4 The theory of successful appeal absolutely voiding a con-
viction and sentence is thought to have its root in the writ of habeas corpus, as a
method for reviewing criminal cases and avoiding the bar of double jeopardy.35
A typical verbalization3 6 of the reversed conviction being quid pro quo a void con-
viction is made in Minto v. State.37 There the court said the defendant could not
have served any part of a former sentence of imprisonment, since there had been no
such sentence which the law could recognize.3 8 One court has called this distinction
"a result seemingly more consistent with dry logic than natural justice."3 9 Another
court40 rejecting this reasoning, but denying credit on other grounds, said:
The Government's brief suggests in the vein of The Mikado, that because the
first sentence was void appellant 'has served no sentence but has merely spent
time in the penitentiary;' that since he should not have been imprisoned at all
... it might be suggested that he is liable in quasi-contract for the value of his
board and lodging, and criminally liable for obtaining them by false pretenses.
We cannot take this optimistic view. Though appellant's first sentence was void,
he was threatened with and suffered imprisonment under it.41
18. In the former case, we held that the judgment was void, and released the petitioner
accordingly; in the latter, we held that the judgment, whether erroneous or not, was
not void, because the court had jurisdiction of the cause; and we refused to interfere.
ISee, State ex rel. Ream v. Leidigh, 54 Neb. 667, 75 N.W. 24 (1898); Hickman v. Fenton,
120 Neb. 66, 231 N.W. 510 (1930).
10 State ex rel. Ream v. Leidigh, supra note 29, at 669, 75 N.W. at 24.
81 Id. at 669, 75 N.W. at 24-25.
2 NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-414 (1943).
Supra note 6.
People ex rel. Lopez v. Killigrew, 202 Ind. 397, 174 N.E. 808, 811 (1931).
Whalen, Resentence Without Credit for Time Served: Unequal Protection of the Laws,
35 MINN. L. REv. 239, 240-44 (1951).
1 Agata, Time Served Under A Reversed Sentence or Conviction-A Proposal and A Basis
For Decision, 25 MONT. L. REV. 3, 37 (1963).
19 Ala. App. 95, 64 So. 369 (1913).
8 Id. at 97, 64 So. at 370.
Ex parte Williams, 63 Okla. Crim. at 395, 75 P.2d at 906 (1938).




In Commonwealth v. Murphy42 the resentence exceeded the first sentence and with
both sentences a day's solitary confinement was imposed, though the limit was one
day. But in Lewis v. Commonwealth43 the court stated that Commonwealth v.
Murphy44 did not hold the first sentence was to be ignored but that credit for time
served was given in that case and that Murphy held time served under a reversed
sentence must be deducted from the maximum permissible for the offense which is
the final basis of sentence.4 5 Lewis also stated that it was not even technically correct
to say that the first sentence must be deemed a nullity, as it was not a nullity, when
it was imposed or while it was being served. "The court had jurisdiction over the
crime of robbery and had jurisdiction over the defendant. The sentence was errone-
ous and voidable for error but was not void until reversed."46 The court was mak-
ing the point that, during the time spent in prison, the sentence was not void but
voidable and the appellant was asking credit for time spent in prison while the judg-
ment was voidable and not yet void.
By the foregoing: the first sentence in King may not have been null and void and
credit might have been granted.
The holding in State v. King is not unusual. It is in the mold of a line of appeals
seeking credit. But, attorneys for prospective appellants will understand there exists
a possibility of detriment to their clients in seeking to overturn an unfair conviction.
This involves speculation. It presumes that an attorney will decide whether a success-
ful appeal will be followed by retrial and, if so, what the outcome will be. Such de-
mands on an attorney require more ritualistic formulas than the law we live under
provides. It necessitates bartering time spent in prison against the right to a fair
trial, something not required of defendants being tried for the first time.
174 Mass. 396, 54 N.E. 860 (1899), afl'd, 177 U.S. 155 (1900).
329 Mass. 445, 108 N.E.2d 922 (1952).
"Supra note 42.
Lewis v. Commonwealth, supra note 43, at 447, 449-50, 108 N.E.2d at 924, 926.
Id. at 448, 108 N.E. 2d at 923.
Criminal Law-Grand Jury-Hearsay Evidence-United States v. Payton,
363 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1966).
ON OCTOBER 3, and again on October 10, 1963, James Payton sold an ounce of co-
caine to Federal Bureau of Narcotics undercover Agent Cockerville for $600 per
ounce. After close surveillance, Payton was arrested at his Manhattan apartment
on November 20 and charged with violation of sections 4705 (a) and 7237 (b) of
the Internal Revenue Code.1 Upon indictment, the only witness to appear before
the grand jury for the government was Agent Ward, an associate of Cockerville, who
I The two sections used by the government are the standard ones used for conviction in
the narcotics cases. One section makes it unlawful for any person, to sell, trade, barter, or in
any way exchange narcotics except by written, authorized order. INT. REv. CODE of 1954,
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related conversations between Cockerville and Payton which he never actually heard.
At the trial, however, the government relied primarily upon the testimony of Cocker-
ville, and Ward's testimony was limited to the relatively unimportant surveillance
techniques. It does not appear from the transcript of the grand jury testimony that
the grand jurors were advised that what they were hearing was, in effect, hearsay
evidence. Upon appeal, the Second Circuit, held, that a prosecutor or witness ap-
pearing before a grand jury does not have an affirmative duty to disclose to the
grand jury that the evidence presented is hearsay.
Although the federal courts2 are bound by the command of the fifth amendment
that an indictment is necessary to hold an accused for a capital or otherwise infa-
mous3 crime, there is no constitutional guide for the proceedings before a grand jury.
This lack of constitutional direction, coupled with the peculiar origin 4 and develop-
ment 5 of the grand jury system is responsible for the outstanding characteristic of
the system, which is still with us,-its secrecy.6 It is no overstatement to say
that "Grand jury proceedings have long enjoyed a character almost sacrosanct." 7 In
view of the aura of secrecy which surrounds the proceedings before a grand jury, it
is not surprising to find that the question of admissibility of evidence before a grand
jury is one of the great unsettled areas of the law.
Functionally, the grand jury is not, as it was in England8 at one time, a body which
tries9 public offenders, but it is essentially an inquisitorial' 0 and accusatorial l body.
Its primary purpose is to determine whether there is probable cause to warrant a
trial on the merits-it need go no further.12 Ideally, the proceedings should be gov-
erned by the same rules of evidence present at a jury trial; practically, this is not
always possible and is not thte rule followed.'3 It is generally established that witnesses
before the grand jury are not limited to the technical rules of evidence established
to insure the rights of the accused in the courtroom.14 Since the indictment consti-
§ 4705 (a). The other sets the penalty for violation of this section which is imprisonment for
two to five years and a fine not exceeding $2,000 (for the first offense). INT. REv. CODE of 1954,
§ 7237 (b).
I The fifth amendment requirement for an indictment applies only to federal jurisdiction
and not for prosecutions in state courts. See Nottebaum v. Mayo, 173 F.2d 574 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 337 U.S. 933 (1949).
3 United States v. Sloan, 31 F. Supp. 327 (W.D.S.C. 1940). See also Green v. United States,
356 U.S. 165 (1958) ("infamous" crime is one punishable by imprisonment in a penitentiary.)
'The grand jury was instituted to protect the right of the individual from arbitrary per-
secution by the Crown. See Olmstead v. United States, 19 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1927).
5 The courts have historically held the grand jury proceedings in the strictest of confidence
and would never allow investigations to be made concerning its activities. See United States
v. Goldman, 108 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1939).
0 Ibid.
Beatrice Foods Co. v. United States, 312 F.2d 29 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 904 (1963).
United States v. Olmstead, 7 F.2d 756 (W.D. Wash. 1925).
o United States v. Atlantic Commission Co., 45 F. Supp. 187 (D.N.C. 1943).
1o In re Grand Jury Investigation, 226 F. Supp. 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
11 Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1932).
United States v. Wortman, 26 F.R.D. 183 (E.D. Ill. 1960).
Brady v. United States, 24 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1928).
"Murdick v. United States, 15 F.2d 965 (8th Cir. 1926); see also United States v. Smyth,
104 F. Supp. 283 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
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tutes merely a preliminary hearing and the accused is still entitled to his day in
court, the courts will rarely dismiss an indictment even though the evidence pre-
sented would undoubtedly have been struck down at the trial. The rule which was
followed was that if there was any competent evidence whatsoever presented,15 the
indictment was valid, even if some of the evidence was tainted. Thus, indictments
were upheld even though there was evidence presented which was: hearsay,' 6
illegally obtained,' 7 or self-incriminating.18
The qualification that there must be at least some competent evidence to prevent
dismissal of an indictment lingered until 1956 when the Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Costello v. United States.'9 Justice Black, speaking for the Court,
held that an indictment based solely on hearsay evidence was valid if returned by
a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury. "The fifth amendment," said the
Court, "requires nothing more."20 There is no doubt that practical considerations
were foremost in the Court's mind in denying the defendant's motion to quash the
indictment:
If indictments were to be held open to challenge on the ground that there was
inadequate or incapable evidence before the grand jury, the resulting delay
would be great indeed.21
The broad sweep of the majority opinion was limited somewhat by the concurring
opinion of Justice Burton. While agreeing with the Court's denial of the motion to
quash, he warns the courts that they must exercise this power when there is "sub-
stantial or rationally persuasive evidence" 22 of prejudice to the accused. The doc-
trine expounded by Costello won immediate recognition and became the landmark
case in the area. It was extended by the opinion in Lawn v. United States23 to in-
clude any incompetent evidence. In Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States24 the
Court went as far as to hold the knowledge of the grand jurors themselves was suf-
ficient and an indictment was valid even though there was no evidence at all pre-
sented.
The federal courts have liberally interpreted the decisions handed down by the
Supreme Court. The Second Circuit has provided the most liberal interpretation
yet by holding in Payton that not only could the grand jury hear hearsay evidence
exclusively, but it need not be apprised of this fact.
Payton based his appeal on two major points: first, that the failure to inform the
grand jury that it was listening to hearsay evidence constituted a denial of due proc-
ess; second, that such procedure used by the government is a "prosecutorial prac-
15 United States v. Frontier Asthma Co., 69 F. Supp. 994 (W.D.N.Y. 1947).
10 Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1927).
17 Supra note 8.
Is United States v. Garnes, 156 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), afJ'd, 258 F.2d 530, cert. denied,
359 U.S. 937 (1959).




355 U.S. 339 (1958)
360 U.S. 395 (1960).
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tice" 25 designed to circumvent the appellant's rights. The first point raised by the
appeal is the conventional one and Judge Feinberg, speaking for the court, had lit-
tle trouble dismissing it. The court admitted that the exact point in question was
not decided by the Supreme Court in Costello, but held that the tenor of that deci-
sion militated against the appellant's claims. The presumption of validity raised by
an indictment 26 has not been sufficiently rebutted. The second point, couched in
terms of "prosecutorial practice" raises an interesting problem and one not so easily
dismissed by the court. In what manner has the appellant been deprived of his
rights? This is accomplished, claims Payton, by withholding from the grand jury wit-
nesses whose testimony there might afford a basis for impeachment of their later
testimony at trial. The majority opinion does not agree with this contention, how-
ever. What the appellant has done, says the court, is to take a "rule of access" and
turn it upside down to constitute a requirement that a witness appearing before a
jury must have also appeared before the grand jury proceedings. The court does
not deny that upon a showing of good cause 27 the defendant in a criminal trial is
allowed access to the grand jury minutes for the purpose of pointing out inconsist-
encies with the trial testimony.28 Yet, in upholding the conviction, the court em-
phasizes that this cannot be construed as a requirement that a witness appear before
both grand jury and petit jury so that an inconsistency, if produced, may be pointed
out. The court finally suggests that the appellant's real claim is in the insufficient
discovery process in criminal cases2 9-a problem which the court is not yet ready to
tackle.
Judge Friendly found the appellant's arguments a little more convincing and
wrote a vigorous dissent. He had previously warned against the use of hearsay evi-
dence in such circumstances in his decision in United States v. Borelli,80 where he
said:
The government ought not to be allowed, by having its principal witness speak
to the grand jury through the voice of another, to deprive a defendant of his
right to impeach by contradiction.31
Judge Friendly also based his dissent on Costello, but distinguished the two cases by
their peculiar circumstances. In the Costello case, he reasoned, there was an excel-
lent reason for limiting the presentation before the grand jury to summary;32 but,
21In this respect also, see United States v. Kane, 243 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) where
the appellant claimed that the practices of prosecuting attorneys in the Second Circuit were
so unethical as to constitute an "abuse of process."
, United States v. Steel, 238 F. Supp. 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); see also United States v. Tane, 29
F.R.D. 131 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
' Schmidt v. United States, 115 F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1940). (Good cause arises when the
disclosure of evidence becomes essential to the attainment of justice.)
21 Dennis v. United States, 884 U.S. 855 (1966).
2 The court refers us to the authorities cited in the Advisory Committee's Notes. See FED.
R. CiuM P. 16. (Proposed Amend.)
10 386 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 960 (1965).
nId. at 391.
2 The proof of the evidence which was presented in that case by hearsay would have re-
quired 141 other witnesses and 868 exhibits at the trial. The agent's lack of direct knowledge
must have been apparent.
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there is no such reason here, save a "transparently unworthy one." Thus, in voting
to dismiss the indictment, he heeded the warning of Justice Burton that: "to hold a
person to answer to such an empty indictment.., robs the fifth amendment of much
of its protective value to the private citizen."38
The decision of the Second Circuit cannot be said to be against the trend of the
recent decisions which have dealt directly with the admissibility of evidence before
the grand jury. Relying on the Supreme Court decisions, the federal courts have up-
held indictments which were based on incompetent,3 4 inadequate,835 or even false386
evidence. In two similar narcotics peddling cases, the indictments were upheld even
though based solely on hearsay evidence.3 7 The sanctity of the grand jury proceed-
ings has not only been strenuously guarded against the attack of evidentiary rules,
but there has been a marked tendency for the courts to refuse to dismiss an indict-
ment for any number of reasons. Indictments have been held valid even though
there was: adverse preindictment publicity,38 perjury of a witness,3 9 improper im-
panelling of jurors,40 delay in the indictment, 41 a disproportionate representation of
racial groups as jurors,42 and when no minutes have been taken.43 The reasoning of
the Eighth Circuit in West v. United States44 is typical:
From a practical standpoint, since a judge is not presiding, it would be difficult
at this point in the litigation to have a final and binding determination of the
legality of the offered evidence. 45
However convincing the decisions purport to be, the tremendous number of appeals
based wholly or in part upon allegedly invalid indictments tends to undermine any
notion of finality. There are apparently many criminal attorneys who are convinced
that the road to appeal via a defective indictment is not closed.
Viewed superficially, the decision of the court is merely an extension of the
Costello doctrine and it was no doubt meant as such. A closer inspection will illus-
trate, however, that the court misapplied the rule in this case. Payton is not present-
ing a mere claim that his indictment was invalid because there was not enough evi-
dence presented to constitute probable cause, but a charge is made that affirmative
action by a prosecutor has deprived him of his right to a fair trial. An indictment
13 Supra note 19, at 364.
" Huerta v. United States, 322 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 954 (1964).
15 United States v. Grasso, 358 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1965). See also United States v. Honer, 253
F. Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
10 United States v. Della Universita, 298 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 950
(1962).
'Williams v. United States, 344 F.2d 264 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 857 (1965);
United States v. Heap, 345 F.2d (2d Cir. 1965).
18 United States v. Osborn, 350 F.2d 497 (6th Cir. 1965), afJ'd on other grounds, 87 Sup. Ct.
429 (1966). See also Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962).
' Coppedge v. United States, 311 F.2d 128 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 369 U.S.
438 (1962).
40 United States v. Wallace & Tiernam, Inc., 349 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
"United States v. Sailley, 360 F.2d 699 (4th Cir. 1965).
United States v. American Oil Co., 249 F. Supp. 130 (1966).
United States v. Caruso, 358 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1966).
"359 F.2d 50 (8th Cir 1966).
Id. at 56.
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based exclusively on hearsay evidence will not per se deny an accused any right-the
grand jurors, appraised of all the facts and knowing the exact nature of the type of
testimony that they are listening to, may feel that this is sufficient to show probable
cause. But, such a procedure as used here has the effect of denying the appellant
his right to use every available means to prove himself innocent. It is true that an
accused's right to impeach testimony by contradiction is not an enunciated constitu-
tional guarantee, but is certainly more than a "rule of access." When such a right is
taken away by affirmative action as evidenced in this case, a prejudicial error has
been committed--one which the courts may use to quash an indictment.
The McNabb-Mallory rule,46 which allows the courts to act as supervisors of fed-
eral criminal procedure, has been specifically held to extend to the supervisory pow-
er over grand jury proceedings.47 The use of such power would allow the courts to
protect the rights of the accused at the level of the grand jury proceeding, an im-
portant pre-trial level. This result would seem to be dictated by the recent Supreme
Court decisions protecting the rights of the individual before trial. With the realiza-
tion that our adversary system begins immediately upon the arrest, the decisions of
the Court in Escobedo v. Illinois48 and Miranda v. Arizona49 can be viewed as con-
trolling in the present situation. If this "complete" protection is to be our goal, then
it would seem that the time has come for the courts to lift the traditional veil of se-
crecy from the grand jury proceedings and exercise their supervisory power over
such proceedings.
The decision in Payton, then, if it is what it purports to be, an extension of the
Costello doctrine, is an unwarranted and illogical one: unwarranted because it goes
against the historical function of the grand jury as a vanguard of individual rights;
illogical because it is contrary to the recent trend toward insuring individual rights
at all stages of the criminal procedure.
"McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943): Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449
(1957).
a In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Central States, 225 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
'8378 U.S. 478 (1964).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Federal Courts-Ancillary Claims and Pendent Jurisdiction-Wilson v.
American Chain & Cable Co., 364 F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 1966).
ROBERT WILSON WAS MOWING HsS LAWN with a power mower manufactured by defen-
dant. When Wilson left the machine for a moment his five year old son climbed
aboard, fell off, and was seriously injured when the blade struck his foot. Robert
Wilson, as guardian of his son and in his own behalf, brought this action against
American Chain for negligence. In the lower court judgment was rendered on a jury
verdict in favor of the defendant as to the minor's cause of action, and the father's
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claim was dismissed for want of the jurisdictional amount.1 In the Third Circuit the
judgment against the minor son was reversed on an error in the instruction to the
jury.2 Dismissal of' the father's action was reversed on the grounds that the father's
claim was ancillary to the son's, and therefore, the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction
was applicable and as long as the son's claim exceeded $10,000 it was not necessary
that the father's claim exceed that jurisdictional amount.3
In basing its reversal of the dismissal of the father's action on the grounds above
stated, the court acted sua sponte. It relied primarily on a Pennsylvania rule of civil
procedure 4 which requires that where parent and child or husband and wife are
asserting claims arising out of the same incident "the two rights of action shall be
redressed in only one suit, brought in the names of the parent and child [or husband
and wife]."5 The court reasoned that since the father's damages flowed to him from
the injury suffered by the son, the father's claim was ancillary to the son's.6 In view of
the Pennsylvania rule and the determination that the father's claim was ancillary to
the son's, the court concluded that the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction should be
applied, so that the father's claim, not otherwise cognizable in the federal courts,
should be carried by the son's action into the federal court for adjudication. The
son's action was based on diversity of citizenship and damages claimed in excess of
$10,000.
In holding that Robert Wilson's claim was ancillary to his son's, the Third Circuit
has given new meaning to that term. While it is true that "[w]hen a federal court has
jurisdiction over the main cause of action, it also has jurisdiction over any proceed-
ings ancillary to that action, regardless of the amount of money involved, the citizen-
ship of the parties, or the existence of a federal question in the ancillary suit. .. ,8
the cases which hold proceedings to be ancillary are not similar to the instant case.
The term ancillary is typically employed to describe proceedings to effectuate federal
judgments or decrees,9 for example, in a bankruptcy proceeding, to enjoin the pros-
ecution of suits against the debtor in other forums; 10 or where the court has ren-
dered a decree in a class suit, to restrain any member of the class represented in the
federal action, and bound by the court's decree, from relitigating in a state court the
issues settled by the federal decree." Where property is in the custody of a federal
court, actions to determine rights in that property are said to be ancillary and inde-
pendent jurisdictional grounds are not required.' 2
The doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction also has been held to apply to both com-
I Wilson v. American Chain & Cable Co., 216 F. Supp. 32 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
2Wilson v. American Chain & Cable Co., 364 F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 1966).
8 Id. at 564.
'PENN. R. CIv. 2228.
r Rule 2228 (a) refers to actions by a husband and wife. Rule 2228 (b) refers to actions by
a parent and child.
0 Wilson v. American Chain & Cable Co., supra note 2, at 564.
Ibid.
8 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcrICE %.90[3], at 822 (2d ed. 1964).
9 Jones v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 157 F.2d 214, 215 (8th Cir. 1946).
°Jacksonville Blow Pipe Co. v. Reconstruction Fin. Co., 244 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1957).
"Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
" Aetna Ins. Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 229 F.2d 584 (10th Cir. 1956).
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pulsory counterclaims and crossclaims. In United Artists Corp. v. Masterpiece Pro-
ductions Inc.18 jurisdiction of plaintiff's claim was based on a federal question, copy-
right infringement. Defendant's counterclaim alleged unfair trade practices and con-
spiratorial activities by plaintiff and others. Some of the other parties brought in on
defendant's counterclaim were of the same state as defendant. It was held that the
counterclaim was compulsory and therefore ancillary to the original claim. Separate
jurisdictional basis for the counterclaim did not have to be shown as to either the
original party plaintiff or the third party defendants. 14 In Dery v. Wyer 1' the action
was against a railroad under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The railroad im-
pleaded a lumber company under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules. There was no diver-
sity between the railroad and the lumber company. The judgment of the lower court
held that each defendant must contribute equally to the settlement. The railroad
appealed claiming the right to full indemnity. Despite lack of diversity between the
railroad and the lumber company, the court decided the issue presented, holding
that the railroad's claim against the lumber company was ancillary to the original
claim. The ancillary jurisdiction attached when the lumber company was impleaded
and it was not lost when the original action was settled. It was not necessary for the
railroad's claim to meet the jurisdictional requirements.16
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has stretched the doctrine of pendent juris-
diction to make it applicable in the instant case. As the court pointed out, the usual
case of pendent jurisdiction involves only one plaintiff and, as the court failed to
point out, two claims, one based on federal law and the other on state or common
law.1 7 In Hurn v. Oursler,'8 a leading case on pendent jurisdiction, the plaintiff
joined a copyright infringement claim based on federal law with an unfair business
practices claim based on state law. The Supreme Court held that the latter should
not have been dismissed since the copyright issue was decided on the merits. The
decision was based on the fact that the case involved two distinct grounds for a single
cause of action. A different result would be required were there two separate "causes
of action only," one being of a federal character. 19 This view was expanded in United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs.20 The "two claims, one cause of action" test was discarded
in favor of a less technical approach. Gibbs sued the union under §303 of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act for violation of a prohibition against secondary boycotts.
Gibbs also sued under the common law of Tennessee, alleging that the union con-
spired to, and did, interfere with his performance of certain contracts. In holding
that the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction was applicable to give the federal courts
power to hear the claim based on federal law, the Supreme Court established what
18221 F.2d 213 (2d Cir. 1955).
I4ld. at 217.
-265 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959). See also Ortman v. Stanray Corp., 35 U.S.L. WEEK 2425
(Jan. 3, 1967).
11 Id. at 807.
17 Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 1047 (1966).
289 U.S. 238 (1933).
"1Id. at 245.
- 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
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must be considered a new test for the application of the doctrine of pendent juris-
diction:
Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever there is a
substantial federal claim and the relationship between it and the asserted state
claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises
one constitutional case ... [I]f, considered without regard to their federal or state
character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected to
try them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of the fed-
eral issues, there is power in federal courts to hear the whole. 2 '
Clearly this broadens the Hurn v. Oursler22 concept of pendent jurisdiction, but
even more clearly, it does not alter the essential meaning of the term. There still
must be a substantial federal claim, a claim based on state law which arises from the
same general circumstances as those surrounding the federal claim, and both claims
must be asserted by a single plaintiff. The term pendent jurisdiction continues to be
used to describe a federal court's ability to decide a non-federal claim which arises
out of the same occurrence as gives rise to the federal question claim.
Despite the arguments advanced by the court that the instant case involves a ques-
tion of an ancillary claim and pendent jurisdiction, what the court has actually seen
fit to countenance is the aggregation of separate claims by several plaintiffs so as to
permit one of them to have his case decided in a federal court, when such court would
not otherwise take cognizance of the case for want of jurisdictional amount.23 It is well
settled that unless claims are of a joint nature, 24 separate plaintiffs cannot aggre-
gate their claims so as to acquire the jurisdictional amount.25 In Payne v. State Farm
Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.26 the facts were similar to those in American Chain. A
father was suing in behalf of his minor son and in his own right. It was held that each
claim must satisfy the requirement of jurisdictional amount. The same result was
reached in DelSesto v. Trans World Airlines.27 In American Chain these cases were
dismissed merely as being "not here applicable." 28
The only apparent reason why cases holding against the aggregation of claims
would not be applicable would be that the jurisdictions where those cases were de-
ll Id. at 725.
22Hurn v. Oursler, supra note 18.
n In American Chain the claim of the minor son did exceed the jurisdictional amount of
$10,000, but the father's claim did not. Therefore, there was at least one claim rightfully
before the court to which the ancillary claim could attach. But this would be no less a ques-
tion of aggregation of claims than if the son's claim were to be for $6,000 and the father's
claim for $5,000. In both situations the father's claim would be wanting the jurisdictional
amount. Query whether the court would be willing to apply the rule of American Chain to
a case where neither party's claim met the jurisdictional requirement?
", Claims or causes of action are said to be joint where there is a single question of law
and fact common to all the complaints, as where in a suit to quiet title, the parties claim
separate parcels of land under a common source of title. See Commodores Point Terminal
Co. v. Hudnall, 283 Fed. 150 (S.D. Fla. 1922).
25For a collection of cases see 5 A.L.R.3d 1048; see note, Multi-party Litigation in the
Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. REv. 874 (1957).
2 266 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1959).
21201 F. Supp. 879 (D.R.I. 1962).
" Wilson v. American Chain & Cable Co., supra note 2, at 564.
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cided did not have any rule of procedure comparable to the Pennsylvania rule here
considered. 29 The rule of procedure was formerly a statute, in effect since 1897.80
Until 1964 the federal courts of Pennsylvania held that it could not be relied upon
to confer jurisdiction on a federal court to hear a claim that did not separately meet
the jurisdictional requirements. In Anicola v. J.C. Penney3' the action was by a wife
for injuries and by her husband for loss of consortium. The district court held that
the Pennsylvania rule did not merge the rights of action of the husband and wife.
The rule was termed purely procedural so as to allow the claims to be asserted in one
action, but the claims were not merged so as to eliminate the requirement that each
claim meet the jurisdictional amount. 2 Not until Borror v. Sharon Steel Co.,8 3 de-
cided in 1964, was a different result approached. That case involved a wrongful
death action and a survival action. Rule 213 (e) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that such actions may be enforced in a single action. 4 The court
held that the actions may be considered ancillary or pendent to one another and it
was therefore unnecessary that there be diversity of citizenship between the party
suing in behalf of the decedent in the survival action and the defendant.3s This view
was developed further in Morris v. Gimbel Bros.36 The action was by the wife for
injuries and by the husband for loss of consortium. A motion to dismiss the hus-
band's action was denied although it was conceded that there was not the remotest
possibility that he could get a verdict for $10,000, or if he did, that it could stand. The
husband's claim was held pendent to his wife's, and this cured the jurisdictional
defect.8 7 The decision in American Chain completes the development of the trend.
In effect, this trend gives certain rules of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure
the weight of substantive law, and makes them controlling over the Federal Rules.
The result reached by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in the instant
case is a desirable one in many respects. It is clearly a result which would be reached
were a state court of Pennsylvania deciding the matter. It thus promotes uniformity
of result within the jurisdiction and thereby gives effect to the rationale behind Erie
v. Tomkins.38 Furthermore, it results in judicial economy-the parties are given the
opportunity of litigating all claims arising from a single occurrence in a single pro-
ceeding.
But such a decision, arising from the court's own motion, to confer jurisdiction
upon a federal court to hear a claim which otherwise it could not hear, should be
questioned. For it must be realized that the court has resorted to judicial legerdemain
to give respectability to what can only be viewed as an enlargement of the Federal
PENN. R. Cirv. P. 2228.
10Act of May 12, 1897, P.L.62 § 1 (parent and child); Act of May 8, 1895, P.L. 54, § 1 (hus-
band and wife).
"198 F. Supp. 911 (E.D. Pa. 1951).81id. at 912.
327 F.2d 165 (3d Cir. 1964).
PENN. R. Civ. P. 213 (e).
15Borror v. Sharon Steel Co., supra note 33.
1246 F. Supp. 984 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
7 Ibid.
-8304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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Rules. The court's reliance upon the terms "ancillary" and "pendent" to justify its
decision would seem to obscure their meanings. For the sake of semantics it would
have been better had the court not resorted to these words to describe what it did. But
the court can label its activities with any terms it desires. What it actually does is what
deserves examination and evaluation. And what it has done is create an anomalous
procedure, whereby, in Pennsylvania, in limited types of cases, a party can sue
another party in a federal court without meeting the jurisdictional requirements as
set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not
infallible but they are generally comprehensive and set out to a considerable extent
and in adequate detail the types of actions which may be joined with others in the
interest of judicial economy.39 For the sake of uniformity within the federal system,
perhaps it would be preferable to add to the federal rules by amendment, after due
consideration, rather than by scattered, hastily reached decisions.
"Rule 20(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for joinder of plaintiffs
where the parties joining their actions assert a right arising out of the same transaction or
occurrence. Under this rule, for parties to join, each party must be able to meet the juris-
dictional requirements. Aggregation of claims is not permitted. See 1 MOORE, FEDERAL
PRAcTIcE 0.97, at 182 (2d ed. 1964). It is submitted that this rule should be controlling over
state rules of procedure in the federal courts.
Spendthrift Trusts-Creditors-
Utley v. Graves, 258 F. Supp. 959 (D.D.C. 1966).
ON APRIL 11, 1962, Olga Graves died testate. Under her will the testatrix created a
spendthrift trust in which her husband, the defendant, was given the income for life.
Subsequently, defendant elected to take under the will, thus foregoing his statutory
share.1 On April 22, 1966, the plaintiff, Freda Utley, obtained a default judgment
against the defendant. Shortly thereafter she instituted a garnishment proceeding
against the American Security and Trust Company, the trustee under the will, in
order to reach the defendant's interest in the trust fund. The district court reasoned
that since the defendant elected to take under the will, thus requiring him to relin-
I D. C. CODE ANN. § 19-113 (a) (Supp. V, 1966):
Subject to section 19-114, a surviving spouse is, by a devise or bequest ... barred of any
statutory rights or interest he has in the real or personal estate of the deceased spouse
or dower rights, as the case may be, unless, within six months after the will of the
deceased spouse :is admitted to probate, he files in the Probate Court a written re-
nunciation. ...
D. C. CODE ANN. § 19-114 (Supp. V, 1966):
A surviving spouse who does not renounce as provided by section 19-115 is entitled to
the benefit of all provisions in his favor in the will of the deceased spouse ...
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quish his statutory rights, he had, in effect, purchased 2 the spendthrift trust and
therefore could not avail himself of the spendthrift provisions.8
A spendthrift trust is an express trust in which the interest of the cestui que trust
cannot be assigned by him or reached by his creditors.4 The underlying purpose of
the settlor in creating such a trust is to insulate the trust from the cestui que's own
imprudence or indiscretion in business transactions. The overriding public policy
of this rationale is that the trust is a free and voluntary gift from the settlor, who has
a right to dispose of his property, while imposing such conditions and limitations
as he chooses; the creditors of the beneficiary are not defrauded, since the gift is
something that the beneficiary would not have had, had it not been for the generosity
of the settlor.5 The doctrine of spendthrift trusts has been accepted by a majority of
the jurisdictions in the United States,6 and the validity of spendthrift trusts in the
District of Columbia has been recognized for many years.7
An exception is made to the general rule sustaining the validity of spendthrift
trusts, when the settlor either creates the spendthrift trust for himself8 or purchases
the rights of a spendthrift trust from another. 9 In either case the beneficiary is the
settlor of the trust. The reason for not allowing the trust in these cases is that it is
contrary to public policy for a man to place his assets in a trust, which provides him
with a steady income, while it prevents his creditors from reaching the trust.10
In Utley" the district court relied upon the rationale expressed in Bank of Com-
merce v. Chambers.12 There, a testamentary spendthrift trust was created by the
2 Purchase is defined as the furnishing of consideration for the creation of the trust.
Infra note 9.
8 Utley v. Graves, 258 F. Supp. 959 (D.D.C. 1966).
' RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 152 (2) (1959).
0 Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 726-27 (1875). See BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 222 (2d
ed. 1965); 2 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 152 (2d ed. 1956).
'There are twenty-four jurisdictions where the spendthrift trust is valid as to both the
income and the principal; of these, six jurisdictions (Ala., Cal., Conn., Minn., Okla., Va.)
have statutes which allow the creditors to reach the surplus above a specified limit. In
seventeen jurisdictions the trust is valid only as to the income; ten jurisdictions (La., Mich.,
Miss., Mont., N.J., N.Y., N.C., N.D., S.D., Wis.) by statute allow the creditors to reach
the excess above a certain limit. There are no decisions in six jurisdictions, and spendthrift
trusts are held invalid in four (Ky., N.H., Ohio, R.I.). See generally LORING, A TRUsrEE's
HANDBOOK 380-86 (6th ed. Farr rev. 1962); GRIswoOLD, SPENDTHRIFt TRUSTS §§ 150-236 (2d ed.
1947); Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 1335, 1347-60 (1954).
7 Shelton v. King, 229 U.S. 90 (1913); Fearson v. Dunlop, 21 D.C. (Tuck. & Cl.) 236 (1892);
Morrow v. Apple, 26 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1928); Ridgeway v, Woodward, 78 F.2d 878 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 575 (1935); Seidenberg v. Seidenberg, 126 F. Supp. 19 (1954),
afJ'd, 225 F.2d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
82 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 156, at 1092-93 (2d ed. 1956). Cf. Liberty Nat'l Bank v. Hicks, 173 F.2d
631 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
92 SCOTT, op. cit. supra note 8, § 156.3, at 1103:
A person who furnishes the consideration for the creation of a trust is the settlor, even
though in form the trust is created by another person.
For example, A creates a trust for B in consideration for B's paying a certain sum to A. The
beneficiary, B, is in substance purchasing the trust for himself.
20 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 156 (1959); 2 SCOTT, op. cit. supra note 8; BOGERT,
op. cit. supra note 5, § 223.
U Utley v. Graves, supra note 3, at 961.
1296 Mo. 459, 10 S.W. 38 (1888).
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beneficiary's deceased wife. An express provision in the will required that the hus-
band release his estate by curtesy in order to avail himself of the trust. After electing
to receive under the will, the husband's creditors attempted to subject the trust to an
attachment. The court stated that spendthrift trusts are valid so long as the benefi-
ciary does not part with something in return for the trust. However, the husband,
in parting with his curtesy right, assumed the attitude of a purchaser, and as such the
income from the trust was subject to his creditors' claims.' 3
The result of the Chambers case was followed in Re Qua v. Graham.14 In the latter
case the husband received an annual annuity from his wife's will. The immunity
of the annuity from execution of creditors depended upon an Illinois statute, which
was only applicable when the trust was created by a person other than the benefi-
ciary. The court characterized the annuity provision as an offer by the wife to pur-
chase the husband's interest in her estate. The consideration given by the husband
was the relinquishment of his curtesy interest. The husband, then, held the annuity
as a purchaser and not as the object of his wife's bounty, and for this reason the an-
nuity could be reached by the creditors.15
In the District of Columbia the surviving spouse must renounce all gifts made to
him by the will of the deceased spouse, in order to claim his statutory share; a written
renunciation must be filed promptly in the Probate Court.16 Judge Holtzoff in Utley
stated that a surrender of the husband's statutory share in his wife's estate is an ex-
change for the benefits of the will, i.e., the spendthrift trust provisions.
The result is that the spendthrift trust under such circumstances is not a free and
voluntary gift on the part of the testator or testatrix. The surviving spouse gives
a consideration for receiving the benefits of the trust by surrendering his or her
statutory rights .... Being a purchaser and in the same position as though he
were the creator of the trust, the provisions surrounding the fund with immu-
nity from claims of creditors, become void. 17 (Emphasis added.)
The act of purchase in the Chambers's case was the surrender by the husband of
his curtesy estate. At common law by curtesy, the husband acquired an inter vivos
interest, rather than testamentary interest, in his wife's real property.19 The interest
of the husband evolved into a present life estate, if his wife predeceased him.20 In
IsBut for [the husband's] compliance with the express condition in the will, by the
surrender of his curtesy in his wife's estate by deed . . . the income provided for his
use would never have become his.
Id. at 466, 10 S. W. at 41.
",187 111. 67, 58 N.E. 357 (1900). See also Miners Bank of Wilkes-Barre v. Weitzenkorn,
32 Luz. Leg. Reg. 129 (Pa. 1938). But see Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Crist, 140 Iowa 308, 118
N.W. 394 (1908). Compare Fleming's Estate, 219 Pa. 422, 68 Atl. 960 (1908); Weller v.
Noffsinger, 57 Neb. 455, 77 N.W. 1075 (1899).
25 "By failing to decline to take under the will [the husband] relinquished his rights to
his share of her estate given him by law, and with such interest purchased the annuity...."
Re Qua v. Graham, supra note 14, at 70, 58 N.E. at 358.
16D. C. CODE ANN. § 19-113 (a) (Supp. V, 1966), supra note 1.
17 Utley v. Graves, supra note 3, at 961.1 8Bank of Commerce v. Chambers, supra note 12.
19 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 5.57, 5.65 (Casner ed. 1952).
0 Prior to the Married Women's Acts of the nineteenth century, the husband had a
present estate in his wife's lands as soon as a child was born. Subsequent to these Acts, the
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Chambers the husband's right had become possessory upon his wife's death, i.e.,
before he elected to receive under the will. In such a situation, when the husband
relinquished his estate in order to acquire the spendthrift trust under the will, he
was in fact purchasing the trust.
The Re Qua2' case does not articulate whether the husband was entitled to an
estate by curtesy, or merely a distributive share of his wife's estate. Because of the
reliance upon Chambers and similar cases relating to dower, it would seem that the
court's reasoning was based on the former.
However, in Utley22 the defendant had no possessory interest in the estate prior to
his election. He had an option of claiming either: 1) statutory dower in all real pro-
perty in which it had attached, or 2) a share in all the realty owned by his wife at the
time of her death. Regardless of which interest the defendant claimed in his wife's
real property, he was also entitled to a share of her personal property.25 Therefore,
when the defendant elected to receive under the will and forego his statutory share,
he was not relinquishing any possessory interest in the property, as in Chambers,24 but
rather choosing between two alternative rights.
The result reached in the Utley25 case is contrary to the views expressed by the
American Law Institute26 and Professor Scott 27 in his treatise on trusts. Their ration-
ale is premised on acceptance of spendthrift trusts per se.
If spendthrift trusts are to be permitted at all, it would seem that a husband
should be allowed to create [a spendthrift] trust for his widow, even though she
may have power to refuse to accept the provisions of his will and take her dower
or distributive share in lieu thereof.28
As is evidenced by the opinion in Utley, the objection is not to the wife's creation of
the testamentary trust, but rather to the rationale of spendthrift trusts in general.
Judge Holtzoff had shown his dislike for spendthrift trusts previously in Seiden-
berg v. Seidenberg.29 A more frontal attack was used in Utley,8 0 when the spendthrift
trust was called, inter alia, "an anomaly and an anachronism." A valid objection can
be proffered that it is inequitable for a person to incur pecuniary obligations,
while at the same time being shielded from any legal liability. Although the more
husband had a protected expectancy, similar to inchoate dower. 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROP-
ERTY, op. cit. supra note 19.
" Re Qua v. Graham, supra note 14.
"Utley v. Graves, supra note 3.
0 MERsCH, PROBATE COURT PRACTicE IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA § 322 (Supp. 1966).
24 Bank of Commerce v. Chambers, supra note 12.
2 Utley v. Graves, supra note 3.
- RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 156, comment f (1959):
Where a trust is created by the will of one spouse in favor of the other, the surviving
spouse does not become the settlor of the trust merely because she or he waives a right
to insist on dower or curtesy or a statutory distributive share of the estate of the de-
ceased spouse.
27 2 ScoTr, op. cit. supra note 8, § 156.3.
211d. at 1106.
29126 F. Supp. 19 (1954), af'd, 225 F.2d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
' Utley v. Graves, supra note 3, at 960.
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sophisticated businesses might be cognizant of the beneficiary's credit standing, the
smaller businesses are more likely to suffer, since they have no facility for an exten-
tive credit check. 81
These were the objections raised when the doctrine of spendthrift trusts was first
initiated in the United States in 1875.32 The raison d'etre has overcome this obstacle,
as is manifest by the overwhelming acceptance of the doctrine. 33 Once the determina-
tion is made to recognize the trust's validity, an exception as is made in the Utley
case, cannot be justified. It seems anomalous that the election statute,3 4 which was
designed to protect the surviving spouse, could be rotated by such a procedure that
it would prevent a husband from giving the same security to his spouse that he can
give to a stranger.
If the position adopted by Utley is affirmed, the result would be that neither a
husband nor a wife would be able to create a valid testamentary spendthrift trust
for the benefit of the surviving spouse. Such a result would be viewed with disfavor,
if the acceptability of the doctrine of spendthrift trusts is to continue in the District
of Columbia.3 5
8 Seidenberg v. Seidenberg, supra note 29, at 21; Utley v. Graves, supra note 3, at 960.
m Nichols v. Eaton, supra note 5.
Supra note 6.
8
'D. C. CoDE ANN. § 19-113(a) (Supp. V, 1966), supra note 1.
American Security & Trust Co. v. Utley, appeal docketed, No. 20589, D.C. Cir., Nov. 28,
1966.
Torts-Federal Employers' Liability Act-Failure to Provide Seat Belts in
Motor Vehicles-Mortensen v. Southern Pac. R.R., 245 Cal. App. 2d 248, 53
Cal. Rptr. 851 (1966).
PLAINTIFF'S INTESTATE, who was an employee of defendant railroad company, was
driving a pickup truck on the freeway while taking two engineers to inspect bridges
along defendant's rail lines when the truck was struck from the rear by an auto-
mobile driven by a third party who was intoxicated.' The truck went off the road;
intestate was thrown out of the truck which then rolled over him and he died an
I Mortensen v. Southern Pac. R.R., 245 Cal. App. 2d 248, 249, 53 Cal. Rptr. 851, 852 (1966).
Cf. Inman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 361 U.S. 138 (1959).
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hour later as a result of severe brain damage. Plaintiff brought this action under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act2 alleging that the railroad was negligent in failing
to provide intestate with a seat belt in the truck and that this was the proximate cause
of death. At the close of plaintiff's case the trial judge granted defendant's motion for
nonsuit3 and dismissed the jury. On appeal the district court of appeal held: the
question of negligence in failing to equip its motor vehicles with seat belts was for
jury determination. 4
There have been a number of cases arising under FELA in which the plaintiff has
specifically charged the defendant railroad with negligence for failure to provide
particular individual safety equipment. 5 The act provides that a railroad is liable
for injury to or death of an employee "resulting in whole or in part... by reason of
any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its . . .appliances ... or other
equipment."6 However, in only one case did the court discuss the question whether
an item of individual safety equipment was an "appliance" or piece of "other equip-
ment" within the meaning of that provision. 7 Decisions in the other cases are gen-
erally based on some combination of the following common law tort rules: 8 a rail-
road employer has a duty to exercise reasonable care 9 for the safety of its employees
commensurate with the circumstances of the particular case, 10 but it is not an insurer
of the safety of its employees;" its negligence 12 must be the proximate cause of injury
235 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1964).
8 The case was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
'Mortensen v. Southern Pac. R.R., supra note 1.
5Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 836 (1961). There are also many cases arising under FELA in
which the plaintiff charged the defendant railroad with negligence for failure to supply
some item of safety equipment or with failure to supply adequate safety equipment as
prescribed by the Federal Safety Appliances Act, 27 Stat. 531 (1908), 45 U.S.C. §1 (1964);
or by the Boiler Inspection Act, 43 Stat. 659 (1924), 45 U.S.C. §22 (1964). The cases dis-
cussed in this note do not involve these statutes.
Federal Employers' Liability Act, 85 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §51 (1964).
Borde v. New Orleans G.N.R.R., 140 So. 810, 814 (La. App. 1932).
[T]he word "appliances" employed in that act [FELA], as we understand it, has ref-
erence to the adjusting of something to the engine, roadbed, or track etc., mentioned
in the statute. The further provision therein made says: "Or other equipment." The
word "other" preceding "equipment" has reference to some apparatus in character
corresponding in nature or kind to the things mentioned in the act.
The court then applied this rule to the case before it in which a railroad employee charged
his employer with negligence for failure to provide him with goggles. "We do not think
that the statute intended to embrace in the words 'appliances' and 'equipment' goggles for
the use of the employees of railroad companies."
1 McGivern v. Northern Pac. Ry., 132 F.2d 213, 217 (8th Cir. 1942). "The common law
rules for determining negligence on the part of an employer towards his employee are
controlling on the question as to what constitutes negligence within the meaning of the
Federal Employers' Liability Act, unless by the terms of the Act common law rules are
abrogated."
OAtlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Craven, 185 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
952 (1951).
10 Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500 (1957).
"Wolfe v. Henwood, 162 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 773 (1947).
1
2 Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R.R. v. Koske, 279 U.S. 7, 10-11 (1929). "The carrier
is not liable to its employees because of any defect or insufficiency in plant or equipment
that is not attributable to negligence."
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or death; 13 it must provide safe places in which to work 14 and safe appliances, 15 but it
need not provide the newest or safest places or appliances where those in use are
reasonably safe. 16
In a number of cases it should be noted that the failure to provide some item of
safety equipment is not the sole allegation of negligence.17 The failure to provide
safety equipment is often coupled with failure to provide a safe place in which to
work. In Bimberg v. Northern Pac. R.R.18 where plaintiff fell from a bridge while
repairing track, the alleged grounds for negligence were: failure to provide a safety
belt, failure to provide ties of prescribed length, failure to provide a solid floor on
which to work, and failure to provide a guard rail.
The majority of the cases deal with three basic items of safety equipment: goggles,
respirators and masks, and protective clothing.19 Other cases charge negligence for
failure to provide safety belts20 or climbing spurs. 21 There is one case in which the
railroad is charged with failure to provide a flashlight22 and one in which it is charged
with failure to provide ear plugs. 23 The equipment involved in these cases taken to-
gether with the settings in which they are involved are traditional railroading situa-
tions.24 The situation in Mortensen is farther removed from this traditional railroad
area.
25
Prior to the 1939 amendment to FELA, recoveries by employees in cases based
1" Sadowski v. Long Island R.R., 292 N.Y. 448, 55 N.E.2d 497 (1944). The defendant in
Mortensen contended that the driver of the automobile which hit plaintiff's truck was the
sole proximate cause of plaintiff's death; it relied on Inman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.,
supra note 1. In that case a railroad employee was injured, while stationed at a railroad
crossing, by an automobile operated by an intoxicated driver. No accidents had occurred
at the crossing during the years in which it was similarly used, and the Court concluded
that such an accident was not reasonably foreseeable. The Mortensen court distinguished
the two cases stating that it could not be concluded, as a matter of law, that the accident
in Mortensen was not reasonably foreseeable since it was shown that the number of auto-
mobile accidents on the freeway on which this accident occurred, and on the roads of
California in general, was considerable.
14See Young v. Clinchfield R.R., 288 F.2d 499 (4th Cir. 1961).
15 Sadowski v. Long Island R.R., supra note 13.
1" Ferrara v. Boston & Maine R.R., 338 Mass. 323, 155 N.E.2d 416 (1959).
"I See Beard v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 243 Ill. App. 537 (1927) (a railroad employee
alleged negligence for failure to provide a safety belt, and for failure to provide climbing
spurs).
18217 Minn. 187, 14 N.W.2d 410, cert. denied, 323 U.S. 752 (1945).
'3Supra note 5.
20E.g., Bimberg v. Northern Pac. R.R., supra note 18; Hallstein v. Pennsylvania R.R., 30
F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1929); Beard v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., supra note 17.
2E.g., Southern R.R. v. Bradshaw, 73 Ga. App. 438, 37 S.E.2d 150 (1946); Cleveland,
C. C. & St. L. R. R. v. Belange, 78 Ind. App. 36, 135 N.E. 367 (1922); Beard v. Baltimore &
Ohio R. R., supra note 17.
Dolmage v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R. R., 241 Minn. 339, 63 N.W.2d 273 (1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 822 (1954).
1 Rubley v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 208 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
"See Annot., supra note 5. Generally, the equipment involved is goggles, masks, or some
article of protective clothing; most of the accidents occur on trains, in yards, or on tracks
and bridges.
21Most of the cases arising under FELA in which a railroad employee is injured or killed
by a motor vehicle involve either a railroad crossing or yard as the site of the accident. The
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on a failure to provide some item of individual safety equipment were often barred
by the railroads' assertion of the defense of assumption of risk.26 Generally, in the pre-
1939 cases charging failure to provide goggles, plaintiff was precluded from recovery
on this ground. 27 He usually succeeded only by rebutting this defense by proving
that he had requested, but had not received, the goggles prior to the time of injury.28
The defense was almost equally effective in cases of failure to provide respirators or
masks29 and in cases of failure to provide safety belts.3 0 After 1939 assumption of risk
was prohibited as a defense3 ' so that many plaintiffs were able to get their cases to a
jury, while before that time they would have been precluded from recovery as a mat-
ter of law.
In Mortensen v. Southern Pac. R.R. the court pointed to the fact that death re-
sulted from intestate's leaving the cab of the truck.3 2 A physicist and two highway
patrolmen of long experience testified that seat belts were effective in reducing
casualties and minimizing injuries. It was also shown that an engineer who remained
in the truck received "much lesser injuries."3 Defendant's own safety department had
called to the attention of the management the desirability of seat belts and recom-
mended their installment.34 Only where there would be a complete absence of pro-
bative facts to support a jury conclusion would a case be withheld from the jury.35
The court coupled the "appliances" and "other equipment" provision of FELA with
the rule that the test of a safe place to work is "whether reasonable men, examining
the circumstances and the likelihood of injury, would have taken those steps necessary
to remove the danger."6 The defendant contended that it was not negligent in that
Mortensen accident occurred on a public freeway, removed from the general sphere of
railroad activity. See Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 1186 (1965).
135 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1964).27 E.g., Chesapeake & Ohio R. R. v. Kuhn, 284 U.S. 44 (1931); Louisville & N. R. R. v.
Hicks, 49 Ga. App. 846, 176 S.E. 698 (1934).
"E.g., Etheridge v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 209 N.C. 326, 183 S.E. 539 (1936). But see
State v. Poolos, 241 N.C. 382, 85 S.E.2d 342 (1955).
"See Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. Clark, 175 Okla. 70, 51 P.2d 539 (1935). The court
decided the case in favor of defendant railroad primarily on the ground that plaintiff had
assumed the risk of injuries, but also added that the railroad had not been shown to be
negligent.
10 See Hallstein v. Pennsylvania R. R., supra note 20; Beard v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R.,
supra note 17.
Federal Employers' Liability Act, 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 54 (1964).
Supra note 1, at 853. "There was testimony that the many fractures suffered by decedent
resulted either from the impact of his body on the ground as he was thrown from the
pickup, or from the vehicle's having rolled over him after he was ejected."
"Id. at 853-54. "The employee riding on the right side was also thrown from the car
[sic], and sustained injuries which were severe although not fatal. The engineer riding in
the center of the seat was not thrown from the car [sic], and sustained much lesser injuries."
"Id. at 853.
Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653 (1946).
"Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Craven, supra note 9. The Mortensen court pointed out,
with respect to the likelihood of injury: "Here, we deal with the general likelihood of auto-
mobile collisions upon the highway, not with the peculiar causation [i.e., the intoxicated
driver] of the particular collision which gives relevance to the need for seat belt protection.
..." Supra note 1, at 252, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
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a California statute3 7 requiring seat belts in new vehicles was not in effect at the time
of the accident,38 and that bus and taxi cab companies had not installed seat belts.
Both of these contentions were ruled inconclusive, but the court did take notice of
the fact that seat belt anchors were required by statute3 9 at the time of the accident.
4 0
The most significant trend in the modern cases applies generally to all cases
arising under FELA as well as the safety equipment cases in particular. Since the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Rogers v. Missouri Pacific
R. R.41 in 1957, no fewer than 22 cases reverse federal and state decisions and say that
the question of negligence is for the jury.4 2 During this period there has been only
one exception to this trend.
43
The general practice or custom of railroads is often determinative in these cases.
It has been held in several cases that where it is a wide railroad practice not to provide
a certain type of safety equipment, it may still be found by the jury that a defendant
railroad was negligent in not providing it in a particular case.44 This will be the case
where "prevalent standards of conduct are inadequate to protect"45 its employees.
In other cases, however, the general practice of railroads has been sufficient to bar
recovery by a plaintiff.46 These cases are distinguished by the fact that the prevalent
practice has been in effect with little incident for some period of time. Thus, where
a signal maintainer was injured while climbing down a tree when his "pole spikes"
became clogged with bark and slipped out of the tree, he alleged negligence on the
part of the railroad for not furnishing him with "tree spikes" which are longer.
Plaintiff did not recover as the evidence showed that "pole spikes" had been cus-
'7 CAL. VEHICLE CODE §27309 (West Supp. 1966).
On and after January 1, 1964, no person shall sell or offer for sale any new passenger
vehicle, other than a motorcycle, which is not equipped with at least two safety belts
or safety belt-shoulder harness combinations of a type approved by the department
which are installed for the use of persons in the front seat of the vehicle.
This section only applies to a retail sale of, or an offer to sell at retail, a new pas-
senger vehicle.
18 The California statute became effective on January 1, 1964; the accident occurred on
October 17, 1962.
3'CAL. VEHICLE CODE §27303 (West Supp. 1966).
On and after January 1, 1962, no person shall sell any new passenger vehicle, other
than a motorcycle, manufactured after January 1, 1962, which is not equipped with
anchors or other devices meeting the specifications established by the department, to
which safety belts or safety harnesses may be attached and secured for at least two
passengers in the front seat.
Such anchors or other devices shall be capable of withstanding a belt assembly load
of 5,000 pounds.
40 The California statute became effective on January 1, 1962; the accident occurred on
October 17, 1962.
"352 U.S. 500 (1957).
See Barrett v. Toledo, Peoria & Western R. R., 34 F.2d 803, 804 (7th Cir. 1964); Harris
v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. R., 358 F.2d 11, 13 (7th Cir. 1966).
'8 Inman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., supra note 1.
"Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
'5Id. at 178 states that FELA liability attaches if defendant knew, or in the exercise of
due care should have known "... that prevalent standards of conduct were inadequate to
protect" its employees.
"E.g., Southern R. R. v. Bradshaw, supra note 21.
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tomarily furnished to, and satisfactorily used by, signal maintainers for a number of
years and were reasonably safe and suitable for such use.4 7 In Mortensen the court
held that defendant's evidence showing that a bus company and a taxi company did
not equip their vehicles with seat belts was not conclusive and adopted the rule laid
down in Urie v. Thompson.48 The introduction of this evidence takes the case into
the common law area and away from the sphere of FELA.
The application of state statutes in actions under FELA is irregular.49 The act
states "that no... employee.. . shall be held to have been guilty of contributory
negligence in any case where the violation by [a] common carrier of any statute
enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of such em-
ployee."50 In St. Louis, I.M. & S.R.R. v. McNamare,51 the court said that a state
statute requiring railroads to block or fill switches, frogs and guard rails was appli-
cable as it did not conflict with the federal act. Where an employee charged negli-
gence for a railroad's failure to have a headlight on its engine, defendant was not
relieved of liability by a statute which permitted such an engine to continue to its
destination without a headlight.52 A state statute giving railroad companies the right
to cut down trees which may be in danger of falling on a road was not superseded by
FELA. 53 Violation of another statute imposing a duty on railroads to block unused
switch tracks, for the benefit of its employees, was actionable negligence.54 But a
state statute requiring land owners to destroy noxious weeds on properties and
railroad rights of way was held inapplicable. 55 The Mortensen court nowhere indi-
cated that the seat belt statute56 would not have been applicable had it been in effect
at the time of the accident. By noting the statute57 requiring anchors for seat belts,
the court intimated that the seat belt statute may have been applicable.
The effect of the Mortensen case insofar as it bears on the question of seat belt
negligence may be considerable both within the range of FELA and in the common
law tort field as well. 58 The case is a logical application and extension of the safety
I bid.
,8 Supra note 44.
,9 The general criterion for applying or not applying state statutes in FELA cases appears
to be whether or not the statute conflicts with the federal act. Most cases dealing with the
applicability of state statutes in an FELA action involve a state workmen's compensation
statute; these statutes are generally held to be inapplicable for the reason that they do
conflict with the federal act.5oFederal Employers' Liability Act, 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1964).
91 Ark. 515, 122 S.W. 102 (1909).
51 Salabrin v. Ann Arbor R. R., 194 Mich. 458, 160 N.W. 552 (1916).
" O'Conner v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 163 Wis. 653, 158 N.W. 343 (1916).
5'Luton Mining Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R., 276 Ky. 321, 123 S.W.2d 1055 (1938).
" Lawrence v. Rutland R. R., 112 Vt. 523, 28 A.2d 488 (1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 693
(1943).
50 Supra note 37.
57Supra note 39.
51 There are three other cases involving the question of seat belt negligence, none of which
arose under FELA. The case of Kapp v. Sulivan, 234 Ark. 395, 353 S.W.2d 5 (1962), involved
a products liability suit against the manufacturer, seller, and installer of an automobile
seat belt which tore during collision; plaintiff alleged that this was the cause of her injuries.
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equipment cases. Also it is conceivable that, in the absence of a federal statute, 59 state
statutes requiring seat belts will be admissable evidence or even controlling on a rail-
road's liability. These statutes do not seem to conflict with the act, and support a
strong public consciousness concerning the serious problem of traffic injuries and
deaths. Mortensen also demonstrates that the failure to provide seat belts in a motor
vehicle may constitute negligence based on common law tort rules. Because of this,
it may become authority for similar cases arising in the master-servant field of torts
beyond the range of FELA; perhaps its effect will reach to other common law tort
actions as well.
A jury returned a verdict for defendant. The verdict was affirmed on appeal, the court
saying that it could have been found from the evidence that the force applied to the belt
during collision was greater than that which the belt was designed to withstand. However,
the court did admit expert testimony on the effectiveness of seat belts during collisions. In
Stockinger v. Dunisch, a trial court decision in For the Defense, December 1964 p. 79, de-
fendant argued that plaintiff who did not fasten his seat belt had a duty to do so, and that
this failure was the cause of plaintiff's injuries which arose out of an automobile collision.
It was further argued that a Wisconsin seat belt statute (WIs. STAT. ANN. §347.48 (1963))
similar to the California statute (supra note 37) was meaningless unless it imposed a duty
upon motorists to fasten their seat belts. Plaintiff's recovery was reduced by ten percent
under Wisconsin's comparative negligence statute (Ws. STAT. §331.045 (1961)). A case almost
identical to Stockinger arose in Indiana in 1965 (Butorac v. Kavanagh, Cause No. S62-7793,
Superior Ct. of Marion, Ind., 1965). In that case the Indiana seat belt statute was not in
effect at the time of the accident, and the court would not permit the jury to find that the
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in not fastening his seat belt. Also the court
would not consider public policy with regard to the use of seat belts and their effect. For a
discussion of the latter two cases see 38 So. CAL. L. REv. 733 (1965).
1 The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (80 Stat. 718) was passed on Sep-
tember 9, 1966. It gave the Secretary of Commerce authority to ". . . establish by order
appropriate Federal motor vehicle safety standards." (§103 (a)). The Department of Trans-
portation Act (Public Law 89-670, 80 Stat. 931) established a department of transportation
and provided for a Secretary of Transportation. The act provided that ". . . the Secretary
[of Transportation] shall carry out the provisions of the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 . . . through a National Traffic Safety Bureau which he shall
establish in the Department of Transportation." (§3 (f) (1)). Recently, the Bureau proposed
many safety features which are to be incorporated into motor vehicles among which is this
provision: "Seat belts must be installed for each forward-facing passenger seat in an auto-
mobile .. " The features are to go into effect on January 31, 1967.
The state seat belt statutes will presumably be in effect with regard to motor vehicles
produced between the time that a given statute became effective and the time that the
federal statute becomes effective. With regard to any further application of the state
statutes the National Traffic And Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 provides:
Sec. 103. (d) Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this
title is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority
either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item
of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of per-
formance of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal
standard. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the Federal Government
or the government of any State or political subdivision thereof from establishing a
safety requirement applicable to motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment procured
for its own use if such requirement imposes a higher standard of performance than that
required to comply with the otherwise applicable Federal standard.
For a further discussion of the seat belt statutes see 14 DEPAUL L. REv. 152 (1964).
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Torts-Libel Per Quod-Special Damages-Hinkle v. Alexander, 417 P.2d
586 (Ore. 1966).
DEFENDANT, THE OPERATOR OF A LODGE, customarily extended credit to loggers if their
employers agreed to be responsible for the bills. Plaintiff had no such agreement with
defendant, yet defendant extended credit to one of plaintiff's employees. Defendant
then tried unsuccessfully to obtain payment from the plaintiff. Consequently, de-
fendant posted in his lodge a statement that one of plaintiff's employees owed a debt.
Written across the face of the bill was this statement: "Wayne Hinkle owes this to
us." The Supreme Court of Oregon held the defendant liable in an action for libel
stating that when one is libelled, he is entitled to collect even though he does not
prove special damages.' The court thus settled a dispute which has been puzzling
Oregon courts since 1928.2
The thinking of early English courts was that damage was presumed from anj
libel.3 The earliest case in accord with this thinking is a 1679 decision.4 Other courts
followed suit,5 and in 1812, Chief Justice Mansfield, despite some misgivings, settled
the English law by stating that the rule was too well established to be overruled.8
This common law rule, which has been adopted by the Restatement, 7 is in keeping
with the decision of the court.
American courts consistently followed the common law rules until 1877 when a
Nebraska court9 ruled that if words are not in themselves actionable, the plaintiff
must prove special damages. Other courts adopted this thinking,10 holding that any
libel not actionable on its face, required proof of special damages unless it fell into
one of the four categories of slander per se.1 1 Thus, libel per quod12 was treated as
slander,13 and special damages were necessary only when the defamation fell outside
the four categories.
1 4
I Hinkle v. Alexander, 417 P.2d 586 (Ore. 1966).
2 Ruble v. Kirkwood, 125 Ore. 316, 266 Pac. 252 (1928).
Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L. Rzv. 839, 842 (1960).
'King v. Lake, Hardres 470, 145 Eng. Rep. 552 (Ex. 1679).
5 Villers v. Morsley, 2 Wils. 403, 95 Eng. Rep. 886 (K.B. 1769); Cropp v. Tilney, Holt 422,
90 Eng. Rep. 1132 (K.B. 1693).
6 Thorley v. Lord Kerry, 4 Taunt. 355, 128 Eng. Rep. 367 (C.P. 1812).
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 569 (1938). "One who falsely, and without a privilege to do so,
publishes matter defamatory to another in such a manner as to make the publication a libel
is liable to the other although no special harm or loss of reputation results therefrom."
8 Runkle v. Meyer, 3 Yeates 518 (Pa. 1803); McClurg v. Ross, 5 Binn. 218 (Pa. 1812); Steele
v. Southwick, 9 Johns. 214 (15 N.Y. 1812).
9Geisler v. Brown, 6 Neb. 254 (1877).
10 Weaver v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 200 Va. 572, 106 S.E.2d 620 (1959); Harrison v. Burger,
212 Ala. 670, 103 So. 842 (1925).
n Prosser, supra note 3, at 844. Prosser notes the four categories in his article as "imputa-
tion of crime, loathsome disease, defamation affecting business, or unchastity on part of a
woman."
1BLACK, LAw DIcrONARY 1005 (3d ed. 1933). Defined as "those expressions which are not
actionable upon their face, but which became so by reason of the peculiar situation or
occasion upon which the words are written."




Federal law originally followed the common law rule;' 5 however, a District of
Columbia case' 6 appears to favor the special damages rule in holding that the
plaintiff is unable to collect since the defendant's article was not libel per se and no
special damages were alleged.
Oregon law reflects the general confusion in this subject. In 1927, the court held
that special damages must be proven when a newspaper article is not actionable per
se, 17 yet a look at the Oregon precedents relied on reveals two slander cases.' 8 Then
in 1928,19 it held that a letter not defamatory on its face was not actionable without
proof of special damages. Two years later,20 the court reversed itself and followed the
common law rule stating that libelous words are actionable when they tend to bring
one into ridicule or contempt. Twenty-nine years later, in Hudson v. Pioneer Ser-
vice Co.,2 L the court reversed itself again and held a printed report charging plaintiff
with an overdue debt as non actionable because plaintiff failed to allege special
damages. Then the court in Murphy v. Harty22 looked to extrinsic facts and deter-
mined that since plaintiff was a minister he was able to collect, despite his failure to
allege special damages, since this was a libel per se.
Noted scholars have wrestled with this problem, and their views are almost as
varied as the case law. Dean Carpenter,23 in a law review article commenting on a
decision favoring the libel per quod rule,24 notes that the artificial distinction of libel
probably grew out of a confusion and mixture of the slander and libel laws, yet he
insists that libel per se and slander per se are not synonomous and criticizes the court
for imposing on libel the backward rule of slander.25
More recently, Professor William Prosser and Laurence Eldgredge have taken
opposing sides in the controversy. Mr. Eldgredge2s favors a retention of the common
law rule, and supports his contention by impressive case law beginning in 1821.27
Professor Prosser,28 on the other hand, cites nineteen different states which hold that
an action for libel per quod cannot be maintained unless there is proof of special
damages.2 9 The cases mentioned indicate how the courts distinguish between libel
per se and libel per quod, and how they occasionally stretch the per quod rule by
requiring special damages for a remark commonly held to be derogatory without
reference to extrinsic facts.3 0 To help clarify the matter, Prosser suggested a revision
1 Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185 (1909).
10 Sullivan v. Meyer, 91 F.2d 301 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
17 Peck v. Coos Bay Times Pub. Co., 122 Ore. 408, 259 Pac. 307 (1927).
Is Barnett v. Phelps, 97 Ore. 242, 191 Pac. 502 (1920); Clark v. Morrison, 80 Ore. 240, 156
Pac. 429 (1916).
11 Ruble v. Kirkwood, supra note 2.
21 Reiman v. Pacific Devel. Society, 132 Ore. 82, 284 Pac. 575 (1930).
21218 Ore. 561, 346 P.2d 123 (1959).
238 Ore. 228, 393 P2d 206 (1964).
Carpenter, Libel Per Quod, 7 ORE. L. REv. 353 (1928).
Ruble v. Kirkwood, supra note 2.
5 Carpenter, supra note 23, at 353-57.
Eldgredge, The Spurious Rule of Libel Per Quod, 79 HARV. L. Rv. 733 (1966).
Thorley v. Lord Kerry, supra note 6.
Prosser, More Libel Per Quod, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1629 (1966).
2SId. at 1639-45.
10 Moore v. P. W. Publishing Co., 3 Ohio St. 2d 183, 209 N.E.2d 412 (1965).
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of the Restatement 8' which would require proof of special damages in all libels ex-
cept those defamatory on their face or falling into one of the four categories of
slander per se.
A more extreme position is taken by Harry G. Henn, 82 who advocates strict adher-
ence to the four categories which are actionable in slander per se. An equating of
libel per quod with slander would, it appears, provide relief to the more serious def-
amations and still not infringe upon the freedom of the people to communicate
facts which they honestly believe to be non-defamatory.
A reading of the court's reasoning in Hinkle v. Alexander 8 reveals that the pri-
mary concern of the court was in adopting the "more workable and less confusing" 4
rule. The court finds support for its holding from cases in three states. In a Wisconsin
decision, 5 the court while recognizing that a majority of the courts had adopted the
libel per quod rule requiring special damages, nonetheless followed the common law
rule and the Restatement 6 requiring no proof of special damages. Also cited by the
Oregon court, as supporting its decision, is a recent New York Court of Appeals deci-
sion8 7 which considers the publication of an engagement announcement of two per-
sons already married. Realizing that the announcement in itself was non-defamatory,
the court nonetheless stated that, under the circumstances, the announcement was a
written accusation tending to hold the parties up to scorn. In disaffirming the libel
per quod rule, the court concludes that "printed statements like those in this news-
paper announcement about married people are libelous per se, that is, that, without
a showing of special damages, they raise a presumption of inevitable actual damage
to reputation."8 The New Jersey case8 9 relied on concerns a newspaper article which
imputes that plaintiff, a labor editor and union leader, attended a union convention
without proper credentials. The plaintiff also contends that the article labelled him
as a Communist sympathizer. The court carefully considers the libel per se-libel
per quod distinction and concludes that since the victim of a libel is damaged equally
by a libel per se and a libel per quod when the recipient of the libel is aware of the
11 Prosser, supra note 3, at 850. Professor Prosser makes this suggestion:
(1) One who publishes defamatory matter is subject to liability without proof of special
harm or loss of reputation if the defamation is
(a) Libel whose defamatory meaning is apparent from the publication itself
without reference to extrinsic facts, or
(b) Libel or slander which imputes to another
(1) A criminal offense
(2) A loathsome disease
(3) Matter incompatible with his business, trade, profession or office
(4) Unchastity on the part of a woman
(2) One who publishes any other libel or slander is subject to liability only upon proof
of special harm.
Henn, Libel-By-Extrinsic-Fact, 47 CORNELL L. Q. 14 (1961).
Supra note 1.
Id. at 589.
8Wisconsin v. Outboard Marine Corp., 15 Wis. 2d 452, 113 N.W.2d 135 (1962).
8 RESTATEMENT, supra note 7.
87 Hinsdale v. Orange County Pub., 17 N.Y.2d 284, 270 N.Y.S. 592, 217 N.E.2d 650 (1966).
81ld. at 287, 270 N.Y.S. at 595, 217 N.E.2d at 652.
1 Hermann v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 48 N.J. Super. 420, 138 A.2d 61 (1958).
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extrinsic facts, it is irrational to require proof of special damages in one instance and
not in the other.40
Using this case law as the legal foundation for its decision, the court continues
its practical approach by rationalizing that since Oregon has a retraction statute,4'
the news media will not be adversely affected by the rejection of the libel per quod
rule.42 Finally the court states bluntly that one who is defamed "should be entitled to
redress." 43
In conclusion, the court in Hinkle v. Alexander, searching for a clear and practical
rule, adopts the common law rule requiring no proof of special damages in any libel
action. The result appears to serve the twofold purpose of resolving the case justly
and of clarifying the libel law of Oregon. Yet, it does not solve the problem of nui-
sance suits by plaintiffs who have suffered no real damage. Rather than advocate a
pendulum swing from one extreme to the other, the court, to attain a practical rule
fair to both plaintiff and defendant, should have considered the means suggested by
Professor Prosser.44 A holding consistent with Professor Prosser's thinking-requiring
special damages only in certain cases--would assure the plaintiff of relief in flagrant
cases and yet protect the careless but innocent defendant.
'Old. at 443, 138 A.2d at 74.
4" ORE. REv. STAT. § 30.150 (1959).
* Hinkle v. Alexander, supra note 1, at 589.
" Hinkle v. Alexander, supra note 1, at 590.
"Prosser, supra note 31.
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